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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND COMPETITION 
POllCY AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
KEVIN C. KENNEDV* 
Although international trade, foreign direct investment, and 
competition policy converge at several points, their overarching 
theme is to increase world wealth by opening markets to foreign 
goods, services, and capital.! These three policies can be mutually 
reinforcing when pursued with the common goal of encouraging 
cross-border competition. For example, a liberal trade policy has as 
its goal the elimination or lowering of barriers to trade in goods, 
opening foreign markets to goods from abroad, and bringing com-
petition to bear on domestic producers. A liberal trade policy.thus 
can have a significant impact on competition and on markets. To 
the extent trade liberalization reduces entry barriers to foreign 
markets, it gives domestic firms less ability to engage in anti-com-
petitive behavior. Similarly, to the extent that domestic firms tie up 
channels of distribution in local markets and thereby block market 
access to imports, a liberal investment policy can eliminate such 
anti-competitive practices by permitting foreign firms to own distri-
bution networks in the local market. In theory, then, trade, invest-
ment, and competition policies ought to work in harmony. Their 
shared goals and objectives suggest teaming rules against private 
anti-competitive behavior with rules on the elimination of govern-
ment barriers to international trade and investment. 
This paper examines whether the mutually-reinforcing roles that 
international trade, foreign investment, and competition policy 
play in opening markets to foreign goods, services, and capital 
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University-Detroit College of Law. This paper is 
drawn in part from two books, KEVIN KENNEDY, COMPETITION LAw AND THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANISATION: THE LIMILTS OF MULTILATERALISM (2001), and COMPLETING THE UNFINISHED 
AGENDA: TRADE Al\1D FOREIGN DIREGr INVESTMENT AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, to 
be published by Carolina Academic Press in Fall 2002. 
1. See OECD, TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICIES: EXPLORING THE WAYS FORWARD 
(1999) (describing the interface between trade and competition policies and the impetus 
for a multilateral approach); WTO Secretariat, Synthesis Paper on the Relationship of Trade and 
Competition Policy to Development and Economic Growth, 'NT IWGTCP IW 180 (Sept. 18, 1998) 
[hereinafter Synthesis Paper on the Relationship of Trade and Competition Policy); Michael J. 
Trebilcock, Competition Policy and Trade Policy, Mediating the Interface, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 71, 
71 (1996). 
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should be integrated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade-World Trade Organization (GATT-WTO) system through 
WTO multilateral agreements on investment and competition pol-
icy. The primary focus is on WTO agreement on competition pol-
icy. The reasons for this focus are fourfold: (1) overall, the issues 
facing negotiators are far more formidable with regard to a compe-
tition policy agreement than with regard to an investment agree-
ment; (2) developing countries have a long-standing objection that 
they will not consider a multilateral investment agreement without 
a parallel agreement on competition policy; (3) the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) has broken the 
trail for negotiations on a multilateral investment agreement with 
the culmination in 1998 of its work on the aborted Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment; and (4) the WTO's follow-on negotia-
tions on trade in services, which will include market access through 
a physical presence of foreign services providers, will be a telltale 
for the prospects of a WTO investment agreement. 
Part I examines the trade and competition policy relationship. 
Part II reviews the investment and competition policy relationship. 
Part III addresses the wisdom of negotiating multilateral agree-
ments on competition policy and investment under WTO auspices. 
Part IV argues that multilateralism is no panacea for resolving 
every cross-border issue that may arise between trading countries. 
Parts V and VI conclude that existing WTO agreements are ade-
quate to resolve at least some competition policy disputes. 
I. THE TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICY RELATIONSHIP 
Although nowhere explicitly stated in any WTO agreement, the 
guiding economic premise that underlies the entire GATT-WTO 
system is open or liberal trade.2 Why did open trade become the 
WTO's desideratum? The answer is short but compelling: by 
exploiting the law of comparative advantage, liberal trade policies 
permit the unrestricted cross-border flow of the best goods and ser-
vices at the lowest prices, thereby increasing total world wealth. 
Under the law of comparative advantage, resources are allocated 
efficiently across and within industries in response to competitive 
pressures from imports. Both of these phenomena lead to product 
specialization and increased firm size that in turn lowers the unit 
cost of goods and services. 
2. See Martin Wolf, Why Trade Liberalization is a Good Idea, in THE URUGUAY ROUND: A 
HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 14 O. Michael Finger & Andrzej 
Olechowski eds., 1987). 
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The role that multilateral trade rules play in fostering liberal 
trade manifests itself in two important ways. First, specialization 
and economies of scale become possible because of secure access 
to a barrier-free international market. Second, increased interna-
tional competition leads to product and process innovation, fur-
ther reducing costs and expanding consumer choices.3 
Until a few years ago, antitrust law was purely a domestic issue 
that arose· in advanced economy countries. Today, it has a new 
name-competition policy, signifying a set of issues broader than 
the prescriptive rules of antitrust law-and has become a priority 
topic on policymakers' agendas. This change was triggered by sev-
eral factors, such as the simultaneous trends toward globalization 
and regional integration, the rebirth of capitalism in Eastern 
Europe, the Latin American economic reforms, the creation of the 
WTO, the new legal instruments for dealing with regulatory reform 
in open economies, and the growing number of competition cases 
involving more than one country.4 
What is the relationship between trade policy and competition 
policy?5 As GATT-WTO agreements have progressively removed or 
lowered government barriers to trade, attention has shifted to pri-
vate barriers to market access that could undermine the progress 
of the GATT-WTO system. The best method for removing these 
private barriers to market access, some argue, is through aggressive 
enforcement of competition laws.6 Consequently, competition law 
directed at private conduct is a natural complement to a set of 
international rules regulating government barriers to market 
access. Like the goal of a liberal trade policy, the goal of competi-
tion policy is in general to promote the efficient allocation of 
resources by ensuring that markets are open and competitive. The 
nine multilateral trade negotiation rounds sponsored by the GATT 
since 1947 have resulted in the progressive reduction of tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services, and with it tech-
nological innovation, investment, lower prices for goods and ser-
3. See The Miracle of Trade, ECONoMIsT,jan. 27, 1996, at 61-62. See generally RAJ BHAlA, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 5-78 (1996) (presenting both classical and contemporary argu-
ments in support of free trade and protectionism). 
4. See UNCTAD, Competition Cases Involving More Than One Country, TD/B/COM.2/ 
CLP/9 (1999). 
5. See OECD,joint Group on Trade and Competition, Complementarities Between Trade 
and Competition Policies, COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(98)98/FINAL at 4 (Jan. 29,1999); Synthe-
sis Paper on the Relationship of Trade and Competition Policy, supra note 1, at II. 
6. See, e.g., JOHN O. HALEY & HIROSHI IYORI, ANTITRUST: A NEW TRADE REMEDY? 
(1995) (arguing that the most efficient method for removing private trade barriers to mar-
ket access is an active antitrust policy). 
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vices, and growth in world gross domestic product.7 By reducing 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, the liberal trade policy 
embodied in the GATT and WTO agreements creates export 
opportunities and spurs international competition among 
businesses. 
Clearly, the objectives of a liberal trade policy seem to closely 
match and complement those of competition policy. The reduc-
tion of government barriers to trade that is the objective of a lib-
eral trade policy complements competition policy's goal of 
shielding consumers from private firms that either unilaterally or 
collectively set prices higher than those that would prevail under 
competitive market conditions. Firms are able to charge higher 
than competitive prices when they have market power, but firms 
are unlikely to have such power when barriers to market entry are 
low. By reducing or eliminating government-imposed barriers to 
market entry in the form of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, markets 
can be made more competitive through lower-cost imports, thus 
making it more difficult for domestic firms to successfully charge 
abnormally high prices to consumers. 
Trade liberalization, however, can fully succeed only if anti-com-
petitive practices of private firms are checked through effective 
competition laws. Competition law can ensure that the reduction 
or elimination of government barriers to trade are not negated by 
the anti-competitive behavior of a private firm through the abuse 
of market power or by a number of private firms through collusive 
behavior. Like a liberal trade policy that removes government bar-
riers to competition at the border, competition policy removes pri-
vate barriers to competition behind the border.8 The two policies 
strive to eliminate or reduce market distortions and barriers to 
market entry. They share the common objectives of promoting eco-
nomic efficiency and welfare through non-discriminatory, transpar-
ent, rules-based regimes. In the absence of an effective competition 
law, the gains from liberalized trade may be undermined because 
of private restraints that deter or prevent access to foreign goods 
and services. Conversely, the absence of trade and investment liber-
alization deters or prevents access to pro-competitive foreign goods 
7. See generally The wro in Brief The Multilateral Trading System - Past, Present and 
Future, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_elinbrieCelinbrOl_e.hUll (last 
visited May 17, 2000) (summarizing the history of negotiation rounds over the past fifty 
years). 
8. This distinction should not be overdrawn, however. One of the pillars of the 
GATT-ViTO system is the national treaUllent obligation that addresses behind-the-border 
discrimination against imported products vis-a-vis the like domestic product. 
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and producers, hampering the ability of competition law to pro-
mote the contestability of markets. 
The economics of competition policy and trade liberalization 
are also quite similar. The overarching concern of competition pol-
icy is with static and dynamic economic efficiency.9 Static efficiency 
refers to the optimum utilization of resources to meet consumer 
demand (allocative efficiency) at the lowest possible cost (produc-
tive efficiency). Dynamic efficiency refers to the process of innova-
tion in technology, products, and processes to meet changing 
consumer tastes.lO A liberal trade policy also seeks to remove barri-
ers to trade in order to achieve allocative, productive, and dynamic 
efficiencies. But it has as other objectives as well, including raising 
revenue, protecting producers, and protecting competitors. 
In SUTtl, trade and competition policies share the common eco-
nomic objective of removing barriers-'-governmental with trade 
policy, private with competition policy-to the competitive process, 
thereby ensuring that international markets are open to all 
entrants. The two policies are thus mutually reinforcing. 
Despite their close interrelationship and common economic 
objective of wealth maximization, these policies also have points of 
divergence and contradiction as well. It must be remembered that 
trade policy has two facets: trade promotion and trade protection. 
Trade remedy laws (e.g., antidumping and countervailing duty 
laws) have as their ostensible goal correcting market dise-
quilibrium introduced by unfair and injurious import pricing prac-
tices, whether in the form of dumping or unlawful subsidization. 
These trade remedy laws can also serve a protectionist purpose, 
however, by raising barriers to market entry by foreign competi-
tors. Two areas of concern in this connection are, first, the extent 
to which domestic producers abuse unfair trade remedy laws by 
bringing actions that force foreign exporters to raise their prices or 
exclude them altogether from the domestic market; and, second, 
9. See OECD, Joint Group on Trade and Competition, Consistencies and Inconsistencies 
Between Trade and Competition Policies, COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(98)25/FINAL, at 6 (Feb. 25, 
1999). 
10. Economists speak of two kinds of efficiencies that are promoted by competition, 
static and dynamic efficiency. Static efficiency is subdivided into productive efficiency 
(operating efficiencies, together with transaction cost savings) and allocative efficiency 
(the allocation of products through the price system in the optimum manner to satisfY 
consumer demand). Dynamic efficiency refers to optimal introduction of new products, 
more efficient production processes, and superior organizational structures over time. See 
UNCTAD, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, Empirical },vidence o/the Benefits from Applying 
Competition Law and Policy Principles to Economic Development in Order to Attain Greater Efficiency 
in International Trade and Development 6-11, TD/B/COM.2/EM/IO/Rev.l (May 25, 1998). 
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the extent to which unfair trade remedy laws take into account the 
effects on competition of unfair trade law proceedings. 
Thus, trade remedy laws and competition law can work at cross-
purposes. Take, for example, the auto parts negotiations between 
the. United States and Japan in the mid-1990's to open the Japa-
nese market for U.S.-manufactured auto parts. The United States, 
through the U.S. Trade Representative, complained that market 
access was virtually foreclosed because of the vertical relationships 
(keiretsu) between Japanese final assemblers and their suppliers. 11 
These relationships are long term in nature and cemented through 
cross-ownership of stock. I2 Although the conduct blocking market 
access is private in nature, the United States nevertheless pressed 
its attack under Article XXIII of GATT, arguing that this was a mar-
ket condition tolerated by the Japanese antitrust authorities that 
nullified or impaired trade benefits accruing to the United States 
under GATT.I3 No one on the U.S. side stopped to question (at 
least publicly) whether this non-tariff barrier to U.S. auto parts 
trade was sheltering inefficient Japanese parts suppliers. Only 
unless the exclusion from the Japanese auto parts market is ineffi-
cient does a misallocation of resources result. The unspoken 
assumption of U.S. trade negotiators apparently was that because 
keiretsu are exclusionary, they are ipso facto inefficient. In other 
words, market foreclosure was synonymous with market ineffi-
ciency. U.S. negotiators either conveniently ignored or were oblivi-
ous to Supreme Court jurisprudence that expressly recognizes that 
long-term vertical relationships can have efficiency benefits. 14 
This episode puts in dramatic relief the disconnect between U.S. 
antitrust enforcement authorities (the Justice Department and the 
Federal Trade Commission) and U.S. trade authorities. It also fuels 
the fire of those who advocate a more coherent and integrated 
approach to the formulation of trade and competition policies. 15 
The advocates of integrating trade and competition policies argue 
II. See generally Kinya Kubo, Distribution Keiretsu and Competition Policy in japan, in 
INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF COMPETITION LAws 75 (Chia:Jui Cheng, Lawrence S. 
Liu & Chih-Kang Wang eds., 1995); Jiro Samura, fOreign Firm Access to japanese Distribution 
Systems: Trends in japanese Antitrust Enforcement, in ANTITRUST: A NEW TRADE REMEDY? 267 
(John O. Haley & Hiroshi Iyori eds., 1995) (both discussing the nature of keiretsu in 
Japan). 
12. See id. 
13. See id. 
14. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1977); United 
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,499-500 (1974). 
15. See, e.g., OECD, Geza Feketekuty, The Scope, Implication and Economic Rationale of a 
Competition-Oriented Approach to Future Multilateral Trade Negotiations, TD/TC(96)6 (1996). 
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that increased globalization of production has made it difficult to 
identity the national origin of both products and firms.16 Conse-
quently, under this view, what is important is devising policies that 
affect the operation of the national and international market, 
rather than the national identity of firms or imported goods. The 
focus of such an approach in trade liberalization negotiations 
would be on reforming national laws that discriminate between 
firms on the basis of nationality, national laws that unnecessarily 
distort the market, and international rules that are essential for the 
efficient operation of global markets. 
Thus, despite their mutually supportive roles, trade policy and 
competition policy often share an uneasy relationship, diverging 
and clashing at many pointsP The underlying rationale of multi-
lateral trade liberalization is to increase aggregate world wealth 
and achieve global productive efficiency. Competition policy is 
focused on enhancing consumer welfare or total welfare (con-
sumer plus producer welfare) within national markets. Much of 
national trade policy is consumed with fashioning adequate trade 
remedy laws (e.g.; safeguards, antidumping, countervailing duty). 
National trade policy makers and legislators decide whether to sac-
rifice consumer welfare for other goals, including protecting pro-
ducers or workers within an industry threatened with import 
competition. ls So too with competition policy. For example, public 
choice theory posits that governments may deviate from a welfare-
maximizing policy for the sake of other non-economic ends, such 
as protecting "national champions," preventing industrial consoli-
dation that would squeeze out politically-influential small produc-
ers, and dispersing control of economic resources. 19 Even when 
governments have welfare-maximization in mind when they formu-
late their competition policy, it will be the welfare maximization of 
their constituents, not of foreign consumers and producers who do 
16. Id. at 3. 
17. See generally Consistencies and Inconsistencies Between Trade and Competition Policies, 
supra note 9 (noting areas of manifest similarities, divergences, and differences in the pol-
icy domains of trade and competition). 
18. See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored 
Nation Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WrO/GATT System, 16 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 27, 
45-51 (1996) (analyzing GAIT Article XXIV on regional trade arrangements using a public 
choice model). See generally Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a Safeguard: A Positive Analysis of 
the GATrEscape Clause with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 255 (1991) (examin-
ing GAIT Article XIX on safeguard relief from a public choice perspective). 
19. See THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPEC-
TIVE 189-287 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995) (analyzing antitrust 
policy from a public choice perspective). 
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not vote. Competition policy thus reflects national concerns. For 
example, export cartels are excepted under many countries' com-
petition laws.20 The upshot is that consumer welfare in the country 
of importation may be sacrificed for the benefit of producers in the 
country of exportation. If total global welfare is reduced as a conse-
quence, then the optimal national policy of the country of exporta-
tion will not match the optimal global policy. In such a policy 
environment, reaching an international agreement on competition 
policy seems highly improbable.21 For the country exercising extra-
territorial antitrust jurisdiction, its national welfare may be 
enhanced, but global welfare may be reduced. 
Competition policy can also clash with the market access goal of 
trade policy to the extent competition policy fails to regulate or 
actively encourages business practices that are anti-competitive. 
Such government-condoned business practices that affect market 
access include (1) export cartels, (2) import cartels, and (3) trad-
ing companies.22 Behaviors by domestic firms in cartels, and behav-
ior by importing countries when acting through state trading 
enterprises, can be anti-competitive when it blocks or impedes mar-
ket access to imported goods from foreign competitors. As 
reflected in the 50-year-old GATT-WTO system, trade policy has an 
international perspective that is built on reciprocity and mutually 
beneficial concessions on market access. If competition policy 
allows private behavior to erode the benefit of this negotiated bar-
gain by foreclosing market access to exporters, then competition 
policy will undermine trade policy. If private anti-competitive 
behavior is widely tolerated by national antitrust enforcement 
authorities, and if such behavior has a significant negative impact 
on market access to foreign producers, then support among 
20. France, Germany,Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the EU 
authorize export cartels. See Ulrich Immenga, Export Cartels and Voluntary Export Restraints 
Between Trade and Competition Policy, in ANTITRUST: A NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDV? 
93-94 (John O. Haley & Hiroshi Iyori eds., 1995); Nina Hachigian, Essential Mutual Assis-
tance in International Antitrust nnfarcement, 29 INT'L LAw. 117,126 (1995); A. Paul Victor, 
Export Cartels: An Idea lVhose Time Has Passed, 60 ANTITRUST LJ. 571, 575-77 (1992). 
21. See Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1501, 
1510-21 (1998) (analyzing the welfare enhancing effects of national versus international 
antitrust legal regimes). 
22. See OECD, COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICIES: THEIR INTERACTION 11-14 (1984); 
Barry Hawk, Overview, in ANTITRUST AND MARKET ACCESS: THE SCOPE AND COVERAGE OF 
COMPETITION LAws AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE (OECD 1996) [hereinafter Hawk]; Elea-
nor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and 
Trade,4 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'V]. 1 (1995) (examining the history of world competition rules 
and alternative approaches to competition in the GAIT agenda). 
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exporters-the constituency with the most to lose-for a liberal 
trade policy will suffer.23 
While competition policy and trade policy share the common 
goals of increasing efficiency and encouraging market access, 
could one policy replace the other? Although this suggestion might 
seem fanciful, just such a proposal has been floated in the case of 
the antidumping duty law.24 Trade policy is at times schizophrenic. 
Trade policy encourages the opening of foreign markets to 
imports, but trade remedy laws authorize the imposition of trade 
barriers to protect domestic producers from import competition. 
Thus, it is important to carefully distinguish the means by which 
these two policies are executed through the respective remedies 
available under trade law and competition law. When examined in 
the light of law rather than policy, the two seem to work at cross-
purposes, at least at the national level. 
Competition law and trade remedy laws differ in respect to the 
interests they are intended to protect. Take, for example, U.S. anti-
trust and trade remedy laws. U.S. trade remedy laws-from the 
countervailing and antidumping duty laws to escape clause relief-
are designed to protect domestic producers and the workers in the 
adversely affected industries from import competition. Generally 
the last thing that U.S. trade remedy laws are concerned with is 
market contestability or the maximization of consumer welfare. 
Trade remedy laws are not concerned with whether imports 
improve competition or lower inflation. Instead, trade remedy laws 
are concerned with protecting domestic industries, firms, and 
workers, not with preserving competition. 
Trade remedy laws can also be abused by domestic producers 
who petition their government to initiate an unfair trade practice 
proceeding solely for the in terrorem effect such a petition might 
have on foreign competitors. Competitors might react by unilater-
ally raising their prices in the case of an antidumping proceeding, 
entering into a price undertaking or suspension agreement with 
the investigating authorities pursuant to which they agree to raise 
prices, limiting their exports, or exiting the market altogether. 
23. See Robert E. Hudec, A WTO Perspective on Private Anti-Competitive Behavior in World 
Markets, 34 NEW ENG. L. REv. 79,83 (1999). 
24. See Harvey M. Applebaum, The Interface of the Trade Laws and the Antitrust Laws, 6 
CEO. MAsON L. REv. 479, 486-88 (1998). An ABA Task Force considered such a conver-
gence/substitution in the context of NAFTA, replacing the antidumping duty law in part 
with the Robinson-Patman Act on discriminatory pricing. See REpORT OF THE ABA ANTI. 
TRUST SECTION TASK FORCE ON THE COMPETITION DIMENSION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT, ch. 6 (1994). 
HeinOnline -- 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 594 2000-2001
594 The Ceo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. [Vol. 33 
Unfair trade remedy proceedings, if abused, can permit collusive 
action on the part of domestic producers to restrain or eliminate 
foreign competition in the domestic market. Thus, the unfair trade 
remedy laws may themselves be the instrument of restrictive busi-
ness practices (RBPs). The filing of an unfair trade remedy petition 
is not a per se anti-competitive practice, but in the United States if 
such petitions are baseless and used to extract concessions from 
foreign competitors through price undertakings, they qualifY for 
treatment under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Under this antitrust 
doctrine, firms that petition the government for enactment of 
favorable laws or the application of existing laws are not subject to 
the provisions of the antitrust laws prohibiting collusion or cartel-
like behavior.25 Under the sham exception to the doctrine, how-
ever, baseless claims filed as part of a conspiracy to harass a com-
petitor are subject to prosecution under the antitrust laws.26 
In contrast to the trade remedy laws, competition law, at least in 
the United States, has at its goal the maintenance of competitive 
markets, thereby maximizing and promoting consumer welfare. It 
is not concerned with protecting domestic firms from foreign com-
petition. The overarching policy goal of competition law is to 
ensure competitive domestic market structures and the efficient 
allocation of resources by prohibiting practices that restrain com-
petition or create barriers to new entrants. The principal concern 
is with protecting competition, not competitors. Competition pol-
icy generally offers no refuge for inefficient competitors against 
lower prices that are the product of efficiency, economies of scale, 
lower unit labor costs, or technological superiority, so long as the 
advantage is fairly obtained. Nor, in most countries, does competi-
tion law permit departure from these principles for firms that are 
caught in a recession, are faced with shrinking markets, or are 
technologically obsolete. 
25. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 658 (1965); Eastern R.R. 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 127 (1961). 
26. See, e.g., Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Ind., Inc., 508 
U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993) (finding that litigation must be objectively baseless and amount to an 
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor to fall under 
the sham exception); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 
380 (1991) (finding that the sham exception applies in situations where individuals use the 
governmental process itself as an anti-competitive tool); Chemicor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl 
Corp., 168 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that protection under the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine will apply despite claims involving misrepresentations); see also Music Center S.N. 
C. Ci Luciano Pisoni & Cia v. Pressing Musical Instruments Corp., 874 F. Supp. 543 (E.D.N. 
Y. 1995) (finding that antidumping petitions do not constitute a sham litigation within the 
Noerr-Pennington immunity exception). 
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A second point where the gears of competition law and the 
unfair trade remedy laws do not mesh smoothly are the extent to 
which competition policy criteria are considered in the enactment 
and administration of the unfair trade laws, specifically, the 
antidumping law. The point of disconnect focuses on the role that 
price plays in the administration of these two sets of laws. The 
antidumping law is triggered when sales in the country of importa-
tion are at prices below those charged in the home market of the 
foreign producer, provided those imports cause injury to the 
domestic industry as a whole (not to just one or two firms within a 
multi-firm industry). An alternative measure of dumping under 
U.S. law (permissible under the WTO Antidumping Agreement) is 
if the imported goods are sold at prices that fail to cover the total 
cost of producing those goods in the home market. Such imports, 
if they also cause injury, are subject to antidumping duties as well. 
Intent to eliminate competitors is not an element of an antidump-
ing case. Competition law, on the other hand, encourages price 
competition and only intervenes where pricing is predatory, i.e., set 
below marginal cost or average variable cost, or set on a discrimina-
tory basis with the goal of restraining competition through the allo-
cation or division of markets. Although a pricing practice may 
cause a rival's exit, it is predatory only if the pricing practice would 
prove to be unprofitable without the additional monopoly power 
(and the ability to capture monopoly rents) resulting from the exit. 
Another misfit between the antidumping law and antitrust laws 
are the defenses that are available in the latter but not the former. 
For example, defenses that would be available in a price discrimi-
nation case-meeting competition or other cost justification-are 
unavailable in antidumping proceedings.27 
II. THE INVESTMENT AND COMPETITION POLICY RELATIONSHIP 
Much of the recent literature confirms that the effects of invest-
ment28 are beneficial for investor country and host country alike. 
For example, the OECD noted the beneficial effects of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in a 1998 communication to the WTO: 
Direct investment by MNEs [multinational enterprises] has the 
potential rapidly to restructure industries at a regional or global 
27. See Applebaum, supra note 24, at 487-88 (discussing procedural and substantive 
differences between antitrust and trade remedy law). 
28. The term "investment" refers to foreign direct investment, i.e., business invest-
ment, including the purchase or sale of business enterprises and the establishment of a 
greenfield investment, not to a portfolio investment. 
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level and to transform host economies into prodigious exporters 
of manufactured goods or services to the world market. In so 
doing, FDI can serve to integrate national markets into the 
world economy far more effectively than could have been 
achieved by traditional trade flows alone. As with private sector 
investment more generally, the benefits from FDI are enhanced 
in an environment characterized by an open trade and invest-
ment regime, an active competition policy, macroeconomic sta-
bility and privatization and deregulation. In this environment, 
FDI can playa key role in improving the capacity of the host 
country to respond to the opportunities offered by global eco-
nomic integration, a goal increasingly recognized as one of the 
key aims of any development strategy.29 
The WTO Secretariat echoed the OECD's conclusions and offered 
some of its own insights on the importance of FDI: 
Despite the difficulties associated with the measurement of the 
efficiency-enhancing effects induced by FDI, let alone with the 
assessment of the specific channels by which a transfer of tech-
nology affects local productivity, the empirical literature offers 
some important conclusions. First, there appears to be a wide 
consensus that FDI is an important, perhaps even the most 
important, channel through which advanced technology is 
transferred to developing countries. Second, there also seems to 
be a consensus that FDI leads to higher productivity in locally 
owned firms, particularly in the manufacturing sector. Third, 
there is evidence that the amount of technology transferred 
through FDI is influenced by various host industry and host 
country characteristics. More competitive conditions, higher 
levels oflocal investment in fixed capital and education, and less 
restrictive conditions imposed on affiliates appear to increase 
the extent of technology transfers. 30 
Noting the benefits of FDI, the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) added in its 1997 World 
Investment Report that a liberal FDI regime must be comple-
mented by supported by rules on competition: 
[FDI] continues to be a driving force of the globalization pro-
cess that characterizes the modern world economy. The current 
boom in FDI flows, which has been accompanied by increasing 
flows of foreign portfolio equity investments, underscores the 
increasingly important role played by transnational corporations 
(TNCs) in both developed and developing countries. This role 
has been facilitated by the liberalization of FDI policies that has 
29. WTO, Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, For-
eign Direct investment and Economic Development 4-5, WT /WGTI/W /26 (Mar. 23, 1998). 
30. \\,TO Secretariat, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, reprinted in Press Release, 
"'iTO, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (Oct. 9, 1996), available at http://www.wto. 
org/wto/engllish/news_e/pres96_e/pr057 _e.htm (last visited May 17, 2000) (footnotes 
omitted) [hereinafter Trade and Foreign Direct investment]. 
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taken place in many countries in recent years, as part of an over-
all movement toward more open and market-friendly policies. 
However, reaping the benefits of FDI liberalization requires not 
only that barriers to FDI are reduced and standards of treatment 
established-the focus of most FDI liberalization to date-but 
also that competition in markets is maintained.31 
National laws and regulations that discriminate against foreign 
direct investment distort international trade in much the same way 
as do tariffs, quotas, and other NTBs. By favoring domestic inves-
tors or discriminating against foreign investors, the most efficient 
producers may not be able to penetrate a market due to govern-
ment interference in the market. Since the 1980s, the worldwide 
trend in national legislation regulating FDI has been to adopt laws 
that attract foreign investors by creating a favorable investment cli-
mate.32 UNCTAD reported that in 1997, 151 changes in FDI regu-
latory regimes were made by 76 countries, 89 percent of which in 
the direction of creating a more favorable environment for FDI.33 
UNCTAD also reported that: "the network of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) is expanding as well, totaling 1,513 at the end of 
1997,"34 one BIT was concluded on average every two and a half 
days in 1997, and "[t]he number of double taxation treaties also 
increased, numbering 1,794 at the end of 1997."35 UNCTAD con-
cludes "the common thread that runs through the proliferation of 
both types of treaties [ ] is that they reflect the growing role of FDI 
in the world economy and the desire of countries to facilitate it."36 
The effects of these liberalization measures are reflected in the 
growth of foreign direct investment. Worldwide FDI grew 25 per-
cent in 1999 to a record $827 billion.37 Developing countries 
received nearly $200 billion of that total, an increase of 15 
percent.38 
31. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REpORT 1997: TRANSNA. 
TIONAL CoRPORATIONS, MARKET STRucrURE AND COMPETITION POLICY at xv, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/TDR/17, U.N. Sales No. E.97.1I.D.I0 (1997). 
32. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REpORT 1998: TRENDS 
AND DETERMINANTS at 56 tbl. I1I.1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/\VIR/1998, U.N. Sales No. 
E.98.II.D.5 (1998) (listing the 143 countries that have enacted special FDI legal regimes) 
[hereinafter 1998 WORLD INVESTMENT REpORT]. 
33. Overview, 1998 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 12, available at http://www.unctad. 
org/en/doc/wir98ove.en. pdf (last visited May 17, 2000). 
34. [d. 
35. [d. 
36. [d. at 12-13. 
37. See Business This Week, ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2000, at 5. 
38. The tremendous FDI spurt was fueled by cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
($797 billion), rather than greenfield investment in new plants and factories. Daniel 
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What role does a liberal investment policy play in the trade~ 
investment-competition policy relationship? An open and hospita-
ble climate for investment between countries increases the general 
welfare of both host and investor country, promotes economic effi-
ciency, stimulates competition among firms, and, in the end, bene-
fits consumers. An investment policy that encourages foreign 
direct investment permits foreign producers to compete with 
domestic producers of the like product in the latter's home mar-
ket, thereby introducing static and dynamic efficiencies. Increasing 
competition within a host country's domestic market can translate 
into lower prices for consumers. A policy of open investment sup-' 
ports a liberal trade and competition policy by encouraging the 
movement of capital to markets where competition is then either 
introduced or increased, and resources are used more efficiently 
and transformed into goods and services for local and worldwide 
distribution. An open investment climate-while not the sole 
determinant of whether an investment will be made, but clearly an 
essential one-greatly increases the chances for new market 
entrants, and with them, increased competition. Not only does an 
open FDI legal regime increase competition in markets for goods 
and services that are tradeable, but it also makes local and immova-
ble markets, where international trade does not provide competi-
tion, more competitive, as is the case with the delivery of many 
services. The availability of new service suppliers enhances compe-
tition. A liberal investment climate can also mitigate or eliminate 
local distribution bottlenecks that might prevent competition, 
especially in situations where local manufacturers own local distri-
bution networks.39 
While it is argued-mostly by developing countries-that MNEs 
are able to engage in restrictive business practices in host countries 
which result in monopoly profits, lower efficiency, and barriers to 
entry by potential competitors, the wro Secretariat has made the 
alternative argument that the entry of an MNE "might have the 
effect of breaking up a comfortable domestic oligopolistic market 
structure and stimulating competition and efficiency. . . . The 
empirical evidence, however, points strongly to pro-competitive 
effects."4o The wro Working Group on the Interaction between 
Pruzin, UN Agency Says IDI Jumped By 2' Percent in '99 to $827 Billion, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) 234, 234 (Feb. 10, 2000). 
39. Report of the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Com-
petition Policy, at 28 para. 126, WT/WGTCP/2 (Dec. 8, 1998) [hereinafter WGTCP 1998 
Report]. 
40. Trade and Fareign Direct Investment, supra note 30, at 16. 
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Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP) has also noted that open 
policies toward FDI and properly functioning competition polices 
are mutually supportive. Liberal investment rules make markets 
contestable, thereby challenging domestic oligopolies and reduc-
ing the likelihood of cartels and monopolies.4l At the same time, 
effective competition polices can ensure against possible abuses of 
market power by foreign investors. Thus, for example, consider an 
exporter who finds himself unable to penetrate a foreign market 
because incumbent wholesalers and retailers, owned or controlled 
by local producers of competing goods, will not handle his goods. 
With open investment rules in place, the exporter could establish a 
new distribution channel or purchase an existing one, thereby 
eliminating the local distribution bottleneck. In short, a liberal 
investment policy, can simultaneously promote competition and 
trade in the host-country market, and perhaps in the global market 
as well. 
Whether a potential host country has in place and actively 
enforces antitrust laws is part of the mix of local business laws that 
foreign investors consider when asking, "Does a fair and predict-
able legal environment for doing business exist in the host coun-
try?" If competition laws are in place and are regularly enforced, 
then potential investors will have at their disposal the means of 
combating local cartels or monopolies that abuse their position. 
The implementation of a transparent and effective competition law 
and policy can be an important factor in enhancing the attractive-
ness of an economy as a site for foreign investment and in maxi-
mizing the benefits of foreign investment.42 Likewise, local firms 
will have the same ability to prevent abuses by foreign investors 
through a transparent and effective competition law and policy. 
Conversely, if antitrust law does not exist in a potential host coun-
try, or if it is loosely or discriminatorily enforced, then potential 
investors might look to other host countries. 
In sum, liberal trade, investment, and competition policies can 
be mutually reinforcing. As noted in a Korean submission to the 
WTO Working Group on Trade and Investment: 
[O]ne can generalize that trade policy determines the relevant 
market for competition policy, and investment policy deter-
mines the relevant players in the market. Therefore, investment 
policy cannot attain its competition objective unless the effect of 
41. WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 
at 24 para. 72, WT/WGTCP/3 (Oct. 11 1999) [hereinafter WGTCP 1999 Report]. 
42. See WGTCP 1998 Report, supra note 39, at 12. 
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trade policy in determining the relevant market is carefully 
considered.43 
The common theme shared by all three policies is to ensure that 
the market is free from restraints that impede the efficient all6ca-
tion of resources, thereby maximizing aggregate wealth. 
Despite their intimate interrelationship, these policies have 
points of departure as well. Competition policy, for example, has 
its focus on "behind the border" (national) issues, rather than 
international issues, whereas trade and investment policy address 
"at the border" governmental measures. Moreover, competition 
policy deals with the efficient allocation of resources within that 
narrower, national market. Consequently, what might be an effi-
cient allocation of resources within a national market might not be 
so at the global level. National antitrust laws also exempt certain 
sectors of the national economy from application of the antitrust 
laws on grounds of national security, food security, and sovereignty 
over natural resources. Similarly, international trade law permits 
the imposition of a temporary safeguard remedy to protect domes-
tic industry from fairly traded imports, thus conflicting with the 
goal of allocative efficiency in the market. So too in the case of 
investment, national laws prohibit foreign ownership of certain 
industries or sectors of the national economy on the grounds of, 
for example, national security or sovereignty over natural 
resources. In short, allocative efficiency is not a shibboleth in trade, 
investment, or competition policy. A somewhat less charitable 
assessment is that these three policies are at times contradictory 
and in a state of conflict. 
III. THE WTO WORK PROGRAMS ON INVESTMENT AND 
COMPETITION POLICY 
Over its fifty-year history, the GATT-WTO system has had as its 
primary goal the elimination of government, as opposed to private, 
barriers to international trade. The kinds of government conduct 
restricting international trade that have been of greatest interest to 
the GATT-WTO members include: reducing and eliminating tariffs 
on imported goods, restricting the use of import and export quo-
tas, imposing disciplines on the imposition of safeguard measures, 
encouraging state-run enterprises (e.g., transportation and mineral 
extraction industries) to adopt market disciplines in their purchas-
43. Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, Communica-
tion from the Republic of Korea, Relationship Between Investment and Competition Policy, at 6, 
Wf/WGTI/W/57 (Oct. 22, 1998). 
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ing decisions, regulating the use of antidumping actions, discour-
aging the provision of subsidies to sunset and sunrise domestic 
industries not otherwise internationally competitive, and limiting 
the extent to which governments can restrict imported goods on 
the basis of standards. All of these trade liberalization measures 
can have the salutary effect of indirectly combating certain restric-
tive business practices engaged in by domestic firms, such as price 
fixing, by allowing greater import competition that will break up 
such illegal arrangements through price competition, 
It is unquestionably true that to the extent private firms engage 
in anti-competitive practices, they can impede international trade 
flows and retard economic development. Some observers contend 
that restrictive business practices may now constitute a more 
important barrier to market access than border controls.44 While 
there is no empirical evidence to support this contention, it is 
unquestionably true that governmental barriers to market access 
are also known to be an important impediment to the free flow of 
goods and services across national borders. Indeed, the point has 
been made in the discussions at the WGTCP that: 
although anti-competitive practices of enterprises might well 
have a detrimental impact on economic development, it was also 
important to consider the impact of anti-competitive policies 
and measures of governments. In many cases, this could be as 
great or greater than that of purely private anti-competitive 
practices. Furthermore, in many cases, ostensibly private anti-
competitive behavior was itself prompted or facilitated by gov-
ernment actions.45 
Whether governmental measures are more important than pri-
vate RBPs in their impact on trade and competition is an empirical 
question, the answer to which could differ from country to country 
and from economic sector to economic sector. Nevertheless, a 
closely-related question to the one of the impact of restrictive busi-
ness practices on international trade flows is to what extent govern-
ments erect similar barriers to trade by directly or indirectly 
supporting or condoning private RBPs. Protectionist pressures can 
lead governments to shelter weak industries and firms from foreign 
competition. Protectionist measures are introduced under the jus-
tification that certain domestic producers are to be preferred over 
their international competitors in the market in order to boost 
domestic employment and income. Government procurement laws 
with buy-national directives, for example, discriminate against the 
44. See Hawk, supra note 22, at 8. 
45. WCTCP 1998 Report, supra note 39, at 15 para. 40 (footnote omitted). 
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lowest cost supplier of a good or service when the supplier is 
foreign. 
Paradoxically, the increased globalization resulting from GATI-
WTO trade liberalization has increased the opportunities of private 
parties to engage in international, anticompetitive behavior. In 
partial recognition of the role that private conduct plays in restrict-
ing trade, at least three WTO agreements speak directly to the 
issue of restrictive business practices. 
First, Article 9 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs Agreement)46 directs the Council for Trade in 
Goods to consider whether the TRIMs Agreement should be com-
plemented with provisions on investment and competition policy. 
Two Working Groups were established to consider these questions 
in 1997, and their work program continues to date. The contribu-
tions of WTO members show that there are many areas of conver-
gence and divergence in national legislation regulating restrictive 
business practices. The Working Group on the Interaction between 
Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP) was most active in 1998 
and 1999. The Working Group's 1998 report recommended that 
its mandate be extended to study three areas more fully: (1) the 
relevance of the core GATT principles of national treatment, most-
favored-nation treatment, and transparency to competition policy; 
(2) possible approaches to promoting cooperation among WTO 
members; and (3) the contribution of competition policy to achiev-
ing the WTO's objectives. 
The Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and 
Investment was also active in 1998 and 1999. The substantive work 
performed by the Group included: (1) studying the implications of 
the relationship between trade and investment for development 
and economic growth; (2) the economic relationship between 
trade and investment; and (3) a stocktaking of existing interna-
tional instruments and activities regarding trade and investment. 
Work continues on identifying common features and differences 
in existing multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements on 
investment. 
Second, Articles 8, 31, and 40 of the Agreement on the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agree-
46. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex ]A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 8] (1994). 
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ment)47 address issues of anticompetitive practices in licensing 
agreements, the abuse of intellectual property rights, and restric-
tions on compulsory licensing. 
Third, Articles VIII and IX of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS)48 prohibits monopoly service suppliers from 
discriminating against foreign firms when supplying their services 
and obligates WTO members to enter into consultations with other 
members on restrictive business practices of service suppliers. 
As one authority on the subject of international competition law 
and 'policy has observed, the possible outcomes at the WTO vary 
from doing nothing to adopting a fully harmonized international 
antitrust code.49 The current literature and the reports submitted 
to the WTO Working Group on Trade and Competition Policy 
show that there is near unanimity that horizontal agreements to fix 
prices and divide markets are anti-competitive and should be pro-
hibited. Countries, however, agree on little else. The WGTCP has 
been unsuccessful in bridging the many gaps that exist among 
WTO members regarding the efficacy or scope of a WTO competi-
tion policy agreement. Differences exist on virtually all other facets 
of competition law-for example, mergers, resale price mainte-
nance, parallel imports, vertical restraints, and abuse of a domi-
nant position. These divergences reflect differences in objectives, 
priorities, the role of government in the economy, and discretion 
in the application of flexible competition rules, such as the rule of 
reason. The following table summarizes the degree of consensus 
on regulation at the national level, the applicable legal standards, 
and on regulation at the multilateral level: 
47. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. IS, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I C, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 81, 87 (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement]. 
48. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. IS, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IB, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF 
THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). 
49. See Bernard Hoekman, Harmonizing Competition Policy in the wro System, I WORLD 
ECON. AFFAIRS 2, 8-Il (1997). 
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Degree of Consensus Degree of Consensus 
to Eliminate/ to Eliminate/ 
Regulate Through Degree of Consensus Regulate Through 
Restrictive Business National on Applicable Legal Multilateral 
Practice Competition Laws Standard Agreement. 
Hard-Core Cartels High High Moderate to High 




Export Cartels High for Importing High for Importing Low to Moderate 
Countries, Low for Countries, Low for 
Exporting Countries Exporting Countries 
Vertical Agreements High Low Low 
Abuse of a High Low Low 
Dominant Position 
Mergers High Low Low 
This table suggests that negotiating an international agreement 
either on minimum competition law standards or on core princi-
ples will be difficult, if not impossible. In 1991, the American Bar 
Association's Special Committee on International Antitrust con-
cluded that no global competition law standards are feasible, a view 
echoed in 2000 by the International Competition Policy Advisory 
Committee.50 Professor Daniel Gifford notes that "international 
discussion about harmonizing competition laws presents a substan-
tial challenge, since the participants are likely to approach the sub-
ject with preconceptions arising out of their differing cultural 
experiences."51 Professor Eleanor Fox adds that "when nations con-
tinue to have different rules (leading to conflict), despite the enor-
mous amount of cross-fertilization that occurs, that tends to 
indicate rooted differences in countries' preferences, which in 
turn may indicate a low feasibility for convergence."52 In June 1999, 
the OECD sponsored a conference attended by 200 trade and com-
petition officials, academics, and business and labor groups from 
the 29 OECD countries and 30 non-member countries.53 The next 
round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations produced no con-
sensus on the inclusion of competition policy.54 In short, building 
50. See 2000 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POL'y ADVISORY COMMITTEE FINAL REp. 271 
[hereinafter 1l,'T'L COMPETITION POL'y REp.]; 1991 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. REp. 294. 
51. Daniel]. Gifford, The Draft International Antitrust Code Proposed at Munich: Good 
Intentions Gone Auny, 6 MINN. ]. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 4 (1997); see also Daniel]. Gifford, Anti-
trust and Trade Issues: Similarities, Differences, and Relationships, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1049 
(1995 ). 
52. Eleanor M. Fox, Comments in BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM: 1998, at 375, 376. 
53. OECD Antitrust/Trade Conference Shows Disparate Approaches Toward Reconciliation, 77 
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 41, 41 (July 8, 1999). 
54. Id. 
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a consensus for a multilateral agreement on competition policy 
continues to be a work in progress. 
Regarding foreign investment, despite the arguments for liberal-
izing national barriers to foreign investment, the failure of the 
OEeD to conclude the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAl) in 1998 shows that making progress on a comprehensive 
multilateral agreement on investment is no easy task. Although the 
OEeD MAl would have been open to acceptance by all countries 
regardless of OEeD membership, many developing countries are 
hostile to the idea in the absence of a complementary set of rules 
on restrictive business practices. Some developing countries fear 
that investment by multinational corporations can result in local 
monopolies that in turn can engage in predatory pricing that 
drives local competitors out of business. In the end, of course, it 
was the OEeD members themselves who spiked the Agreement. At 
the risk of laying too much blame on anyone country, France had 
strong reservations about the negative impact the MAl would have 
on its cultural industries (a misapprehension undoubtedly shared 
by Canada).55 Other OEeD members felt unrelenting pressure 
from domestic environmental groups who pressed their case 
against the MAl as being a threat to the global environment. In 
addition, labor advocacy groups wondered how the MAl might 
negatively affect developing-country labor markets by developed-
country multinational investors. In the end, the OEeD MAl was a 
dead letter by late 1998, notwithstanding the high hopes shared by 
most participants in the negotiations that a successful conclusion 
of the negotiations was barely weeks away. 
Although no comprehensive WTO agreement regulating all 
aspects of FDI currently exists, the GATT-WTO system does inte-
grate trade and FDI in several important respects. The treatment of 
FDI in WTO agreements is fragmented and limited, but ever 
expanding in the services sector under the GATS. With the col-
lapse of the OECD negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, the spotlight has shifted to the WTO as the forum for 
possibly concluding such an agreement. The lesson for the WTO is 
clear: tread carefully. Moving the discussions on a multilateral 
investment agreement from the OEeD to the WTO could be pour-
ing old wine into a new and bigger bottle. 
Support for international disciplines on investment and private 
RBPs came from the United States during the drafting of the ill-
55. See generally UNCTAD, Lessons From the MAl (1999) (presenting different view-
points concerning the Multilateral Agreement on Investment). 
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fated Havana Charter on the International Trade Organization in 
1947, when the United States supported chapters on investment 
and restrictive business practices. More recently, the United States 
has complained about private barriers to market access in Japan 
where vertically integrated firms (keirestu) buy exclusively from 
each other. Whether the United States became disenchanted with 
multilateral efforts to resolve competition law disputes, or whether 
it simply saw no advantage in pursuing multilateralism when it 
could exercise extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction, is not clear. 
Whatever the reasons, the United States dropped its support for 
international disciplines and turned instead to unilateral and bilat-
eral approaches to the problem. Still, the United States acknowl-
edges the need for international cooperation and information 
sharing in cross-border competition investigations. 
Today, governments other than the United States (primarily 
Canada, the EU, and Japan), international organizations, policy 
makers, and academics argue that the time is now ripe for WTO 
agreements on investment and restrictive business practices.56 In 
connection with an agreement on competition policy, the argu-
ment runs that harmonization of national antitrust laws would have 
at least three salutary benefits. First, a WTO competition policy 
agreement that harmonized national laws would provide a more 
predictable legal environment within which multinational firms 
could operate. Second, WTO-centered dispute settlement would 
reduce duplication of enforcement efforts by national enforce-
ment authorities. Third, harmonization under WTO auspices 
would avoid conflicting jurisdictional disputes and potential con-
flicting decisions by national enforcement authorities. 
Yet business groups, other academics, the U.S. government, and 
other countries are moderately suspicious of multilateral solutions 
that call for the harmonization of national competition laws and 
56. See Sir Leon Brittan, The Need for a Multilateral Framework of Competition Rules, in 
TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICIES: EXPLORING THE WAYS FORWARD 29 (OECD ed., 1999); 
Daniel Pruzin, United Nations Calls for WTO Role in Checking Multinational Monopolies, 16 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1209, 1209 (July 21, 1999); Daniel Pruzin, EU Outlines Goals for WTO 
Talks on Seroices, IP, Competition Policy, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 968,968 (June 9, 1999); 
Japan fTC Proposes Global Rules in the wro for Competition Policy, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 
720, 720 (Apr. 28, 1999); WTO Cites Need for Competition Rules for Business Practices that Restrict 
Trade, 14 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) 2221, 2221-22 (Dec. 24, 1997); Spencer Weber Waller, 
The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B. U. L. REv. 343, 346-47 (1997); Eleanor 
Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. I, 1-5 (1997). But see Friedl 
Weiss, From World Trade Law to World Competition Law, 23 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 250, 271-72 
(acknowledging various advantages to \<\'TO regulation on competition but concluding 
that it is not yet time for a comprehensive agreement). 
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the resolution of international competition law disputes in an 
international dispute settlement forum such as the WTO.57 For this 
group, multilateralism is no panacea. Harmonization of national 
competition laws will not necessarily address issues of efficiency in 
a global marketplace. Instead, national authorities will be focused 
on the impact to the domestic market of restrictive business prac-
tices. EU and U.S. trade officials, for example, would use interna-
tional competition disciplines to promote exports and reduce 
conflict in cross-border merger approval. But they are probably less 
interested in exposing domestic firms to competition law disci-
plines when those firms are engaged solely in export activity. 
Smaller countries, on the other hand, are also interested in market 
access but would welcome an international agreement and 
enforcement mechanism that reaches anti-competitive practices 
engaged in abroad but with effects in their domestic market. In 
addition, not all countries will benefit equally from such an agree-
ment. Competition policy seeks generally to restrain the anti-com-
petitive behavior of firms and thereby increase consumer welfare. 
But firms that engage in restrictive business practices and consum-
ers whose welfare is to be increased are distributed unequally 
among countries. Countries thus have different incentives at differ-
ent times for regulating or not regulating firms that engage in 
RBPs. For these reasons, the prospects for successfully concluding 
a multilateral agreement on competition policy seem remote. 
Before its indefinite postponement in December 1999, several 
WTO members (including the EU, Japan, and Korea), academics, 
and other commentators urged that the WTO Millennium Round 
include on its agenda negotiations leading to multilateral rules on 
investment and antitrust.58 Japan would like to see the WTO 
57. See, e.g., INT'L COMPETITION POL'y REp., supra note 40, at 263-67; Joel I. Klein, A 
Reality Check on Antitrust Rules in the World Trade Organiz.ation, and a Practical Way Forward on 
International Antitrust, in TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICIES: EXPLORING THE ""AYS FORWARD 
37 (OECD ed., 1999) (presenting an argument against WTO negotiations on antitrust 
rules, based on a lack of ability to foresee future issues); Don Wallace,Jr., ReasonsforSkepti-
cism, 34 NEW ENG. L. REv. 113 (1999) (questioning the need for a global solution); Joel I. 
Klein, No Monopoly on Antitrust, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at 24 (arguing that ""TO involve-
ment in antitrust policy is premature); MeritJanow, Unilateral and Bilateral Approaches to 
Competition Policy Drawing on Trade Experience, in BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM:1998 253 (dis-
cussing the international impact of domestically-regulated antitrust policy); Gary G. Yerkey, 
u.s. Opposes Plan to Negotiate Agreement in WTO, Officials Say, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 
2034, 2034-35 (1997) (noting U.S. opposition to such the adoption of a WTO agreement 
aimed at eliminating anti-competitive business behavior). 
58. See Prospects Diminishing for Talks on Rules Cauering Investment, Competition, 16 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1598,1598 (1999); The Border of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4,1998, at 
69; Crroperate on Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 16. Switzerland and the Central 
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assume jurisdiction over international antitrust issues as a way of 
fending off the bullying tactics of the United States to push Japan 
to enforce its antitrust law more aggressively. It seems, however, 
that an equal or even greater number of WTO members resisted 
this call,59 including the United States, Mexico, India, Pakistan, 
Egypt, Hong Kong, the member-countries of ASEAN, and several 
Central American countries. In the case of competition policy, the 
138-member WTO is hardly of one mind as to what constitutes 
anticompetitive behavior. First of all, just more than half of the 
WTO membership has enacted some type of competition law, and 
in many of those countries enforcement mechanisms and institu-
tions have not been thoroughly tested. Among the countries that 
do have a competition law in force, some countries favor price fix-
ing, while others condemn it. In addition, some countries are sus-
picious of vertical agreements between wholesalers and retailers, 
and between manufacturers and suppliers. 
The enforcement mechanisms vary as well among countries. The 
process in the United States is largely judicial, whereas in the EU 
the process is more administrative in nature. Private parties may 
sue under U.S. antitrust law and may recover treble damages, while 
in some other countries the enforcement process is left to govern-
ment authorities. Criminal prosecutions can be brought under 
U.S. antitrust law, while in some other countries competition law 
violations are a civil matter only. 
Suspicions exist in the United States that the EU's call for a com-
prehensive trade negotiation round that includes negotiations on 
investment and competition policy is a red herring designed to 
draw attention away from negotiations on agricultural subsidies, a 
politically sensitive issue within the EU.50 In addition, in connec-
tion with negotiations on competition policy rules, the United 
European Free Trade Agreement countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) also supported \""TO negotiations on competi-
tion policy rules. Prospects Diminishing for Talks on Rules Covering Investment, Competition, 16 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1598, 1598 (1999). See generally Fox, supra note 22 (examining the 
history of world competition rules and alternative approaches to competition in the 
GATT/vVTO agenda); Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: optionsfor 
the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 1289 (1995) (discussing options for an improved global com-
petitive regime); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the \tTO 
System, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. lO97 (1995) (arguing for the adoption of standard competition 
rules within the WTO). 
59. See, e.g., U.S. Outlines Priorities for \tTO Seattle Ministerial, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 
1285, 1285 (1999) (noting competition and investment policy were conspicuously 
excluded from United States's goals for the ""'TO's 1999 meeting). 
60. See EU Official Says Support Growing for Comprehensive Trade Round, 16 Int'l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 1284, 1284 (1999). 
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States, speaking chiefly through the Justice Department, is of the 
opinion that reaching agreement on common antitrust rules 
within the WTO is preordained to fail given the diverse composi-
tion of the WTO membership.61 Concern has also been expressed 
over trade-offs and compromises in WTO negotiations over com-
mon competition rules in order to conclude negotiations on, for 
example, agriculture.62 The Justice Department has no desire to 
see U.S. antitrust rules used as bargaining chips in WTO negotia-
tions on trade in agriculture or services.63 A similar reservation is 
that WTO negotiations on common rules could result in a ratchet-
ing down that would weaken strong national rules, as well as an 
ossification ofmles that are included in a multilateral agreement.64 
The Justice Department also questions the wisdom of allowing 
WTO dispute settlement panels to possibly second-guess the Justice 
Department in its handling of antitrust cases.65 A closely related 
objection is that businesses and national authorities will be reluc-
tant or will flatly refuse to turn over confidential business informa-
tion to a WTO panel for fear that such information will find its way 
into the hands of a foreign competitor.66 The EU has responded to 
part of this criticism by advocating a competition policy agreement 
that is not covered by the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding.67 
At the WTO, an active debate over the merits of multilateral 
agreements on competition policy and investment has just 
begun-this not surprising. First, before 1950, few countries even 
had competition laws, and those that did took a benign approach 
to cartels.68 Second, not until the late 1980s did any country with a 
competition law other than the United States apply their law to 
extraterritorial conduct affecting their markets. Today, the extra-
territorial application of countries' competition laws is not 
reserved exclusively to the United States. Third, because of the suc-
cess of the GATT-WTO trade system in globalizing national econo-
mies, coupled with the boom in transnational mergers and 
61. Joel I. Klein, A Note of Caution with Respect to a \VTO Agenda on Competition 
Policy, Address before the Royal Institute of International Affairs Chat ham House London 






67. Joanna Shelton, Competition Policy: What Chance far International Rules? 2 OECD J. 
COMPETITION L. & POL'y 57,60 (1999). 
68. Id. 
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acqUISitIOns, an increasing number of competition law enforce-
ment actions have cross-border effects. 
To the extent they exist, private restraints and agreements can 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for foreign firms to gain market 
access overseas for its goods, services, and capital. But can private 
anticompetitive behavior be successful in stifling competition with-
out the tacit or active support of government? Should the adoption 
of minimum standards on competition law and enforcement be 
required of all WTO members, just as minimum standards of intel-
lectual property protection are mandated for all WTO members 
under the TRIPS Agreement? The absence of competition law in 
most WTO-member countries does not necessarily present an 
insurmountable obstacle to a WTO agreement on competition pol-
icy, just as the absence of intellectual property protection in many 
WTO members did not prevent the conclusion of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
Do the international dimensions of national antitrust enforce-
ment support the argument for a WTO competition policy agree-
ment? Would such an agreement reduce international frictions in 
the area of transnational mergers and acquisitions, an increasingly 
popular mode of entry into foreign markets? International merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activity is a general concern because it can 
reduce the competitiveness or contestability of a market. It is of 
special concern to the national authorities of the acquired firm 
because it represents a diminution of national sovereignty and con-
trol over domestic enterprises. The growth in foreign direct invest-
ment underscores the importance to some of reaching a WTO 
competition policy agreement that takes into account these trans-
border concerns. 
Several benefits of having a WTO multilateral agreement on 
competition policy have been identified.59 First, although it is 
widely agreed that private anti-competitive practices can, in theory, 
have an adverse impact on both international trade and invest-
ment, no WTO mechanism exists for policing these practices. A 
multilateral agreement on competition policy would fill this gap. 
Second, because private anti-competitive practices increasingly 
have an international dimension, there is a need for multilateral 
cooperation among national enforcement authorities to comple-
ment bilateral and regional efforts in this regard. Third, a multilat-
eral agreement on competition policy will foster a competition 
69. See WGTCP 1999 Report. supra note 41. at 24 para. 74. 
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culture, thus reinforcing the GATT-WTO system overall. Finally, a 
multilateral agreement on competition policy could reduce trans-
action costs for businesses engaged in cross-border transactions 
regarding compliance with various countries' competition laws. 
Despite the purported benefits of a WTO agreement on compe-
tition policy, whether the WTO will ever conclude multilateral 
agreements on either investment or competition policy remains 
doubtful. U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky stated in 
late 1998 that work on an agreed set of competition rules under 
WTO auspices was not yet sufficiently well advanced to warrant 
WTO negotiations on such an agreement. 70 She also stated in May 
1999 that she saw no possibility of MAl-type negotiations at the 
WTO.71 Considering the diverse and broad WTO membership, an 
argument can be made that the WTO is the proper forum for con-
cluding such multilateral framework agreements, not only because 
of its broad-based membership, but because of the close link 
between trade, liberalized investment rules, and international 
enforcement of mutually-agreed upon competition rules. But hav-
ing said that, policy makers and government officials would be 
foolish to ignore the lesson of the OECD MAl fiasco. Extrapolating 
from the collapse of the MAl, the lesson is clear: if a small club of 
developed countries could not reach a binding agreement on a 
subject such as foreign investment, where most of them have a rela-
tively open investment climate and where their foreign investment 
laws are not dramatically far apart, then what chance is there of 
reaching agreement on competition policy under WTO auspices-
a subject that touches the sensitive and raw nerve of national sover-
eignty-among 138 economically, politically, and culturally diverse 
nations? 
In addition, from the integration of national economies it does 
not inexorably follow that a multilateral legal approach to competi-
tion law and policy, let alone a multilateral approach under WTO 
auspices, is necessarily the right approach. Multilateralism is no 
desideratum. Indeed, it has limits that policymakers need to recog-
nize. The legal and political arguments against such an approach 
are formidable and convincing. Strengthening domestic antitrust 
laws to eliminate restrictive business practices that close off market 
access to imported goods and services seems a more preferable and 
70. See U.S. Welco~ WTO Decision to Continue Antitrust Talks But Rules Out Negotiations, 
15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2087, 2087 (1998). 
71. WTO Trade Agenda Left Unresolved at Conclusion of OECD Ministerial Meetings, 16 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 914,914 (1999). 
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effective approach, one that countries would more readily embrace 
than would be the case with multilateral rules that are forced down 
their throats. Forcing the liberalization of domestic laws on foreign 
direct investment likewise may be a solution in search of a prob-
lem. Although we do not live in a market economist's perfect 
investment world (i.e., a world that is barrier free to the flow of 
investment capital from whatever source), bilateral and regional 
agreements on investment, WTO commitments on non-discrimina-
tion and market access to goods and services, not to men tion uni-
lateral "disarmament" in the form of domestic laws that place no 
barriers in the way of foreign capital, have made any multilateral 
investment agreement in large part redundant. 
Today, the WTO's prestige, reputation, and authority are at an 
all-time low. It is a fragile institution. When you visit the WTO web 
site, the WTO reminds the visitor of just how fragile it is with an 
image of an egg. The United States, its most powerful member, has 
been ambivalent at times in its support of the WTO and its goal of 
promoting liberal trade. The commitment of the United States to 
U.S. participation in the WTO is less than whole-hearted. 72 But 
even the most vocal government critics of the WTO have called for 
reform of the Organization, not for U.S. withdrawal from it.73 At 
the same time intemperate and pandering remarks by President 
Clinton at the WTO Seattle Ministerial Conference in late 1999, 
suggesting that the WTO conclude an agreement on core labor 
standards that would be enforced through trade sanctions, steeled 
the resolve of developing countries not to be steam rolled by the 
72. Despite the U.S. Trade Representative's ringing endorsement of continued U.S. 
WTO membership in her March 2000 Report, a resolution was introduced in Congress 
calling for U.S. withdrawal from the WTO pursuant to section 125 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.c. § 3535 (mandating a five-
year review of U.S. participation in the WTO); 2000 TRADE POL'y AGENDA & 1999 ANN. 
REP. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM; Gary 
G. Yerkey, USTR Sends Report to Congress Urging Continued U.S. Participation in wro, 17 rnt'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 394, 394 (Mar. 9, 2000). That resolution was defeated in the House of 
Representatives on June 21, 2000 by a vote of 363-56, compared to a November 1994 
House vote of 288-146 to join the Organization and approve the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments. Press Release 00-49, Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Barskef 
sky Hails Overwhelming House Vote on WTO, Bipartisan Vote Rejects U.S. Withdrawal from wro 
Oune 22, 2000), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2000/06/00-49.html(last visited 
August 13, 2000). 
73. See Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Set to Issue Report Defending Continued U.S. Participation in 
wro, 17 rnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 341,341 (Mar. 2, 2000) (explaining that House Minority 
Leader Richard A. Gephardt continues to support U.S. participation in the organization, 
but dispute settlement system needs to be reformed). 
HeinOnline -- 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 613 2000-2001
2001] Foreign Direct Investment and Competition Policy at the lVTO 613 
WTO's developed-country members at any new, WTO trade negoti-
ation round. 
All of these developments are unfortunate because the WTO sets 
rules that bind rich countries and poor countries alike. The big 
losers from the debacle in Seattle may in fact be the developing 
countries. A liberal trade policy is a policy of increased competition 
and opportunity; such a policy holds great promise for the develop-
ing countries of the world. 
IV. THE LIMITS OF MULTILATERALISM 
Although multilateral agreements on investment and competi-
tion policy negotiated under WTO auspices have their advocates, at 
present it remains an open question whether anti-competitive busi-
ness practices that have international trade effects should be made 
the subject of a WTO agreement on competition policy. Only after 
a consensus builds for a WTO-sponsored agreement on trade-
related aspects of competition policy will it be appropriate and 
fruitful for the WTO members to tackle this subject. And not until 
the question shifts from whether the WTO should address this 
issue to how the WTO should deal with these issues will the time be 
ripe to broach the subject of negotiating a WTO multilateral agree-
ment on competition policy. 
Assuming that a consensus does build, is a WTO competition 
policy agreement a solution in search of a problem? To what 
extent are purely private RBPs a significant barrier to market 
access? The OEeD Secretariat noted in 1999 the absence of relia-
ble data on the scope of this problem: 
Given the lack of any measure or systematic data, anecdotes are 
relied upon. The survey data that was presented at the confer-
ence involved only a small number of respondents and could 
not be extrapolated. Given the lack of data, some suggested that 
there should be no presumption that the current regime is bad 
or needs changing.74 
74. OECD Secretariat, Summary, in TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICIES: EXPLORING THE 
WAYS FORWARD 12 (OECD ed. 1999). Proponents of a multilateral agreement insist that 
anti-competitive practices increasingly have an international dimension, which thereby 
affects the interests of many v\,TO members. They also add that the notion that anti-com-
petitive practices are unimportant is inaccurate, considering the frequent occurrence of 
anti-competitive practices with cross-border effects, investigations against international car-
tels, and merger reviews involving more than one jurisdiction. Nevertheless, supporting 
evidence remains anecdotal. See WTO, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade 
and Competition Policy, Communication by the European Community and Its Member 
States, Impact of Anti-competitive Practices on Trade, v\,T /WGTCP /W /62 (Mar. 5, 1998); WTO, 
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Communica-
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Is there even such a phenomenon as a purely private RBP? The 
available evidence suggests that in many instances anti-competitive 
business practices by private firms receive either active or tacit gov-
ernment support. When asked to provide examples of the interac-
tion between trade and competition policies as part of an OECD 
survey, the issues listed by the responding governments did not 
involve strictly private arrangements but rather arrangements in 
which the government was an essential participant. 75 WTO mem-
bers may still protect domestic firms even after dismantling tariff 
and other barriers to trade, either by failing to provide, or to pro-
vide adequately, effective competition laws and enforcement mech-
anisms, or simply by deliberate non-enforcement of competition 
laws. These lapses-the classic "beggar-thy-neighbor" policy-cre-
ate a market advantage over countries with stricter competition 
rules. If, in fact, most private RBPs are government supported, 
query: do existing WTO legal instruments provide an adequate 
mechanism for addressing them? A GATT Article XXIII:l (a) nulli-
fication or impairment complaint could be brought against private 
RBPs that receive active government support, and a GATT Article 
XXIII:l (b) non-violation nullification or impairment complaint 
would provide a means of challenging private RBPs that receive 
tacit government support, such as through weak or lax competition 
law enforcement. 76 These remedies are discussed more fully below. 
Besides government support of private RBPs, government barri-
ers to market access are arguably much more important trade bar-
riers than private RBPs. Even after full implementation of the 
Uruguay Round agreements, a substantial number of high tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers to trade will remain in place, especially in 
sectors of special interest to developing countries, such as agricul-
tural trade, textiles and clothing, and footwear and leather goods. 
In most other trade sectors, competition will be enhanced more by 
trade liberalization or by greater international cooperation 
between national enforcement authorities than by the introduction 
of competition law reforms by the WTO. Even though border mea-
sures are waning as barriers to market entry for trade in most 
goods, they have not disappeared. Government measures, such as 
product standards, safeguard measures to protect domestic indus-
tion from Norway, Impact of Anti-Competitive Practices of Enterprises and Associations on Interna-
tional Trade, WT/WGTCP/W/73 (Mar. 30,1998). 
75. See OECD, Cases of Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, COM/ 
TD/DAFFE/CLP (92) 50 (1992). 
76. See Hudec, supra note 23; Bernard Hoekman & Peter C. Mavroidis, Competition 
Policy and the GATT, 17 WORLD ECONOMY 121 (1994): 
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tries from import competition, subsidies to domestic producers, 
and restricted market access for services trade are arguably still 
more important barriers to trade than are private RBPs. Interna-
tional trade continues to be hampered by governmental market 
distortions, such as government procurement policies that discrim-
inate against foreign goods and services, and distortions flowing 
from regional trade arrangements. Further trade liberalization and 
a recommitment to the core non-discrimination principles of most-
favored-nation and national treatment offer more effective means 
for reducing barriers to trade and promoting competition. 
Moreover, WTO provisions on trade-related competition policy 
issues-Article IX of GATS, Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
and Article 9 of the TRIMS Agreement-recognize the sovereign 
right ofWTO members to regulate RBPs, without actually prescrib-
ing substantive competition rules. This decentralized approach is a 
reflection of the lack of consensus on what the competition rules 
should be and what the best legal instruments are for dealing with 
RBPs, which contrasts with the general consensus among econo-
mists and government officials that liberalization of government 
barriers to trade leads to beneficial welfare effects. In addition, a 
proposal for a multilateral WTO competition policy agreement is 
inconsistent with the culture of the WTO. In the GATT-WTO sys-
tem, members are required to ensure that their domestic laws are 
in conformity with the rights and obligations of the relevant WTO 
Agreements. The WTO Agreements are largely proscriptive, not 
prescriptive, in nature. For example, the Antidumping Agreement 
prescribes the requirements for members who have or wish to 
enact an antidumping duty law, but no member is required to 
enact antidumping legislation. Even where a WTO Agreement is 
prescriptive, such as the TRIPS Agreement, the WTO leaves it to 
the individual member to determine how it should give effect to 
GATT-WTO prescriptions in its domestic legislative or administra-
tive processes. 
Nevertheless, even if one concludes that it would be premature, 
unwise, and unnecessary to launch negotiations on a WTO agree-
ment on competition policy, two anti-competitive practices of for-
eign firms that distort competitive conditions in export markets 
illustrate the need for greater cooperation among trading nations 
and, perhaps, multilateral proscriptions: price discrimination and 
collusive behavior through export cartels. The first is dealt with 
under the antidumping duty laws and the price discrimination pro-
scriptions of competition law. The fit of the two bodies of law, as 
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has been exhaustively explored in the literature, is poor, but at 
least there is in place WTO-approved rules regulating the use of 
antidumping measures. 
In the case of export cartels, on the other hand, the WTO has no 
clear mechanism in place to deal with this anti-competitive prac-
tice, other than an Article XXIII: 1 (b) non-violation nullification or 
impairment complaint. Export cartels may reduce the welfare of 
consumers in the foreign import market, but they increase the wel-
fare of producers in the country of exportation. In the absence of 
an agreement on positive comity, export cartels cannot be disci-
plined because the jurisdiction able to investigate effectively and 
gather evidence is unwilling to do so, and the jurisdiction with the 
incentive to investigate is prevented from doing so because of its 
inability to collect information. A third area of friction with an 
international dimension involves multijurisdictional conflicts over 
proposed mergers. 
In any event, even assuming the potential utility of international 
rules to regulate private RBPs, the WTO is not the ideal interna-
tional organization for negotiating or developing such rules, or for 
policing such practices. The GATT-WTO system is less concerned 
about economic efficiency than it is about market access, less con-
cerned about enhancing total welfare (consumer plus producer 
welfare) in markets than it is about ensuring that producers have 
access to export markets. The GATT-WTO system is at its core a 
forum with a mercantilist approach to multilateral trade negotia-
tions-that is, a system that is market-access oriented and that pro-
motes global trade through reciprocal trade concessions. In that 
capacity the GATT-WTO system plays an important role in making 
markets more competitive by reducing government tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade. It has been successful in that role it for over 
fifty years, but not completely successful. Despite fifty years of effort 
toward trade liberalization, the restrictive and distortive effects of 
government measures, especially trade remedies, still appear to be 
more harmful to trade and competition than those of private 
RBPS.77 Would not further work by the WTO toward completing its 
unfinished agenda of opening markets to foreign goods and ser-
vices be a more effective means of promoting the contestability of 
markets? The closer countries move toward open market access, 
the less opportunity there will be for RBPs to be pursued in domes-
tic and international markets. Accordingly, the WTO should stick 
77. See WGTCP 1998 Report, supra note 39, at 21 para. 59. 
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to its assigned role by completing the unfinished agenda of reduc-
ing and eliminating government barriers to trade in goods and ser-
vices. Promoting liberal trade, coupled with fostering an open 
investment climate, should be the WTO's focus. These goals in 
themselves are part of competition policy, although they go by dif-
ferent names. This approach can be defended on the economic 
ground that competition would be enhanced more by trade liberal-
ization than by the introduction of new WTO rules relating to 
national competition laws and international cooperation. It can be 
defended on the legal ground that the traditional GATT-WTO 
portfolio has been to focus on governmental measures affecting 
conditions of competition. 
The legal and economic framework within which international 
rules on competition policy would be negotiated and agreed upon 
is an important one. But equally, if not more important, is the 
political context. A WTO approach to trade and competition pol-
icy, as just described, is preferable to an agreement on competition 
policy on the political ground that the time is not ripe for detailed 
discussions under WTO auspices on the harmonization of national 
competition laws and policies. 78 Do countries have the political will 
and desire to reach agreement on international competition pol-
icy? The United States opposes any agreement on competition pol-
icy negotiated under WTO auspices, while the EU is its chief 
proponent.19 So where do the parties go from here? 
From the foregoing discussion, it can be safely said that if market 
access is prevented by RBPs, then those practices have cross-border 
effects and, consequently, such practices pose a threat to interna-
tional competition. Is the harm sufficient that an international 
response is necessary? Are national competition laws adequate to 
the task of addressing the problem?80 The major players in the 
international trade arena-the EU,Japan, and the United States-
have antitrust legal regimes in place. A great deal of divergence, 
however, exists among those systems. What is more, even assuming 
aggressive enforcement by national authorities, their focus will 
tend to be on the national impact of anti-competitive business 
practices, not on their international ramifications. An example of 
78. Se.e id. at 25-26 para. 75. 
79. See U.S. opposes Plan to Negotiate Agreement in WTO, Officials Say, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) 2034 (1997). See generally Fox, supra note 22 (concluding that previous experience 
has led the EU to pursue worldwide efforts on world competition, while the United States 
has been reluctant to pursue the such efforts). 
80. Intellectual Praperty Rights, Economic Power, and Global Technology Integration, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 463, 470 (1996) (questioning the effectiveness of national competition laws). 
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the inconsistent treatment caused by this myopic perspective is the 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger in 1995. The Federal Trade 
Commission gave unqualified approval to the merger, yet the EC 
Commission attached several conditions to its approval. Interest-
ingly, the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger was not a conse-
quence of the growth of international trade or of foreign direct 
investment. Yet certain conflicts of jurisdiction in the area of com-
petition law enforcement arose as a direct consequence of the 
growth of international trade and of foreign direct investment. 
In addition, the countries most vulnerable to restrictive business 
practices are also the countries least capable of combating them: 
developing countries. Although more and more developing coun-
tries and transition-economy countries have adopted competition 
laws, most of them have not. One defensive (and cheap) response 
has been to protect local firms and infant industries by restricting 
access of foreign investors and foreign traders to their markets. 
The upshot is the impoverishment of the protectionist country, 
damage to international competition, and an overall decline in 
aggregate world wealth. 
On the other hand, national regulation of restrictive business 
practices-augmented by bilateral cooperation agreements-while 
perhaps less efficient, is arguably a more effective way to address 
the problem of cross-border antitrust violations. Regulation at the 
international level creates additional transaction costs, raises con-
cerns of political legitimacy within the country where business con-
duct is being challenged, and thus could strain international 
relations. While bilateral agreements on antitrust cooperation and 
information sharing between countries are useful, the ultimate 
goal could be a multilateral agreement harmonizing the antitrust 
laws of all nations. At present, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body is 
an untested forum for resolving competition policy disputes. But 
harmonization is a lofty goal, especially in light of each nation's 
strong self-interest in the field of competition law and policy. 
Would not international regulation of restrictive business practices 
avoid duplication of effort at the national level by several national 
authorities? The answer given by Judge Diane Wood is that "the 
existence of many authorities does not itself make the case for 
internationalization, because competition cases in the end deal 
with competitive conditions in particular countries."81 The legal 
approach taken by the GATT and WTO agreements in addressing 
81. Wood, supra note 58; at 5. 
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the trade-competition policy relationship has been anything but 
coherent or comprehensive. But the legal approach taken to 
address the issue matters very little if the political will is lacking to 
conclude an international agreement. Moving the key players to 
the point where they perceive it to be in their national interest to 
have such international rules is the crucial first step. Once that 
threshold is crossed, the question of the legal vehicle by which to 
negotiate these rules can be explored, whether as a stand-alone 
international convention, such as the ill-fated OECD Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment, or under the auspices of another inter-
national organization, such as the WTO. If such an agreement is to 
be negotiated, close attention must be paid to whether it makes 
economic, legal, and political sense to negotiate it within a broader 
international legal regime, such as the GATT-WTO system, or as a 
stand-alone agreement negotiated under the auspices of the 
United Nations or the OECD. Fortunately, we have real-world 
experiences by which to judge the success of bilateral and regional 
agreements on competition policy. On the other hand, elevating 
those bilateral and regional efforts to the multilateral plane takes 
us into uncharted waters. A large body of scholarship and studies 
has accumulated over the last ten years that advocates adoption of 
multilateral competition rules under WTO auspices. Powerful 
WTO members, most notably the EU, have weighed in favor of a 
WTO agreement on competition policy. 
Yet several essential conditions must exist before negotiating and 
successfully concluding such an agreement. The first condition is a 
consensus among policy makers as to what constitutes prohibited, 
anti-competitive behavior by private firms and the value of having 
an open trade environment. Because of different political and eco-
nomic philosophies among WTO members as to the proper role of 
government in the national economy and in regulating private bus-
iness behavior, that consensus is lacking. For example, what types 
of business behavior should constitute a per se violation of competi-
tion laws and what conduct should be subject to a balancing test (a 
rule of reason) that weighs the pro-competitive effects of business 
behavior against its anti-competitive effects? Again, a consensus 
does not exist. 
The second condition is a consensus on the optimal legal instru-
ment for promoting competition policy. Here again, issues of 
national sovereignty, especially within the United States, point in 
the direction of national rules enforced extraterritorially and bilat-
eral legal instruments to address transborder antitrust problems. 
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Closely related to the national sovereignty hurdle blocking a multi-
lateral antitrust agreement are powerful, and too often underesti-
mated, sentiments of nationalism and national pride that prevent a 
consensus from building for a multilateral agreement. This senti-
ment runs especially strong when the topic is protecting national 
champions from being out-competed by foreigners. These strong 
nationalistic proclivities undermine efforts to conclude a multilat-
eral competition policy agreement, either under WTO auspices or 
in any other forum. 
The third condition is a consensus on the best forum for negoti-
ating multilateral rules on antitrust and the structure of those 
negotiations. Many solid arguments can be made for holding such 
negotiations in the WTO. Even better arguments can be made for 
assigning responsibility for developing international competition 
rules to the OECD, which has studied this question extensively. 
Assigning to the WTO the task of policing private conduct would 
expand its portfolio substantially. The WTO and its predecessor, 
GATT, have had as their raison d 'etre the elimination of government 
barriers to international trade and, under the GATS, services as 
well. This historical fact does not necessarily dictate that the WTO's 
mandate and focus remain on government barriers to trade to the 
exclusion of private anti-competitive conduct in perpetuity. Never-
theless, until the WTO has fulfilled its primary mandate, that is, 
until it has completed the unfinished business of eliminating the 
many government-supported barriers to market access-barriers 
that are far and away more important economically than any pri-
vate barriers to market access-it would be premature, ill-advised, 
and dangerous to the health of the institution to expand its 
mandate. 
While the WTO is not in extremis, constitutionally it is not suffi-
ciently robust to resolve satisfactorily all competition policy dis-
putes between its members. Although the WTO might indeed be a 
natural forum for negotiating such an agreement, as suggested by 
some scholars,82 because of the opportunities for using bargaining 
chips and making trade-offs among and between trade sectors, the 
single undertaking, "package deal" approach that characterized 
the Uruguay Round makes the WTO a far less promising forum for 
successfully negotiating a competition policy agreement whose 
terms would be considered acceptable to all WTO members. On 
82. See Ernest-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Governments and for 
Private Business: A Trade Law Approach for Linking Trade and Competition Rules in the WTO, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 545,560-61 (1996). 
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the other hand, if the structure of negotiations is one that includes 
many agenda items, the opportunity then exists for compensating a 
WTO member with a concession in the services sector, for exam-
ple, in exchange for a concession it makes in the competition pol-
ity negotiations. 
The fourth condition is a consensus that a comprehensive, 
global approach to addressing restrictive business practices under 
WTO auspices is preferable to deepening and broadening the 
existing patchwork of bilateral and regional agreements, comple-
mented by the restrictive business practice provisions in several 
WTO agreements. While more bilateral agreements might not be a 
bad development, bilateral cooperation agreements do not address 
the issues of countries with no competition law or of countries 
where competition laws are either not enforced or are weakly 
enforced. Regional agreements based on minimum RBP standards 
work best among countries with common cultures, histories, and 
legal traditions. The Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Rela-
tions Agreement (ANZCERTA) and the ED are examples. Indeed, 
such commonalities may be necessary conditions. 
The fifth condition is a consensus that it is in each country's 
national, economic self-interest to conclude a multilateral agree-
ment on competition policy. Such a consensus unquestionably 
developed in the case of trade in goods, as evidenced by the broad-
based membership in the WTO. But even then many countries' 
commitment to the goal of free trade has been less than unflagging 
over the past fifty years, and the consensus, such as it is, took over 
two hundred years to develop from the time Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo first wrote on the economic benefits of liberal trade. 
The sixth condition is a consensus that a WTO agreement on 
competition policy is to reduce the friction caused by the extrater-
ritorial application of national antitrust laws. As noted in a 1984 
OECD Report on Competition and Trade Policies, "[a]lthough 
there seems to be growing observance of moderation and self-
restraint, in the absence of multilaterally agreed upon criteria, uni-
lateral approaches are not likely to be successful in resolving all 
conflicts which may arise."83 That assessment begs the question: 
would an international agreement on RBPs be any better at resolv-
ing, or at least reducing, the frictions? At present, international 
antitrust enforcement in today's global economy is characterized 
by three features: (1) the extraterritorial application of a country's 
83. OECD, COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICIES: THEIR INTERACTION 138 (1984). 
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antitrust laws to conduct occurring wholly or partly outside that 
country where such conduct causes anti-competitive effects in that 
country; (2) cooperation between national authorities in the 
enforcement of their competition laws; and (3) the adoption of 
principles on positive comity to avoid disputes arising from a coun-
try's failure to prevent RBPs that occur in its territory that cause 
injury to another country.84 The current legal regime for cross-bor-
der . enforcement of competition law-largely bilateral, less often 
regional-is not frictionless. If developing and applying interna-
tional rules on competition policy are the preferred solution for 
resolving cross-border antitrust disputes, how are such interna-
tional rules to be enforced? Are lapses in enforcement to be pun-
ished through trade sanctions? Would the imposition of trade 
sanctions be consistent with the WTO's mission of promoting lib-
eral trade? Would such an international sanctioning mechanism 
reduce international friction or only exacerbate it? 
The WTO, as a forum for sorting out questions of conflicting 
and overlapping jurisdiction between national enforcemen t 
authorities, is no desideratum. Indeed, to the extent that rules on 
international antitrust enforcement are multilateralized under 
WTO auspices, the greater the risk of heightened global tensions 
among WTO members. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
cannot itself eliminate or reduce political friction. The experience 
from the protracted Hormone Beef and Bananas disputes teaches 
that WTO dispute settlement, as improved as it is from its GATT 
predecessor, has not been the silver bullet that its supporters 
thought it would be. As Professor Russell Weintraub notes, "Folks 
who cannot prevent the banana war between the United States and 
the European Union are not ready for so ambitious a project as 
unifying antitrust law."85 On the contrary, the WTO dispute settle-
ment mechanism has at times increased trade tensions. The dis-
pute settlement mechanism might give the victorious vVTO 
member international bragging rights, but it does little to reduce 
frictions and might instead inflame the losing party. The wrench-
ing experience of the Hormone Beefand Bananas disputes, coupled 
with the pointless Antidumping Act of 1916 complaint and dispute 
settlement proceeding, provides ample support for the view that 
84. See Crystal L. Witterick, Regulation of Competition in the Canada/U.S. Context-Extra-
territorial Reach of u.s. Antitrust Law A Canadian Perspective, 24 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 299, 299-300 
(1998) . 
85. Russell]. Weintraub, Globaliwtion's Effect on Antitrust Law, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 27, 
35 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
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the WTO cannot be expected to act as the parent that disciplines 
the unruly child whenever it misbehaves. 
In the end, experience shows that the good will of the disputing 
parties is the essential ingredient to bringing a WTO dispute to a 
mutually satisfactory conclusion. Even if WTO members were to 
take a minimalist approach and agree to certain common rules on 
restrictive business practices, asking the WTO to step in to resolve 
an international antitrust dispute would not necessarily reduce 
international friction. On the contrary, it could exacerbate ten-
sions if it meant condemning an antitrust enforcement action that 
the WTO member deemed to be in its national interest. If a WTO 
agreement on competition policy was adopted, how would the 
alleged failure of a WTO member to enforce its national competi-
tion laws be satisfactorily resolved? Can WTO panelists-even com-
petition law experts-fully appreciate a WTO member's national 
competition laws and the policies that inform it? If antitrust law 
enforcement is turned over to the traders, will the enforcement 
focus shift from protecting competition and consumers to protect-
ing domestic producers from import competition? A good interna-
tional trade agreement ("good" meaning a trade agreement that 
liberalizes trade and opens markets) may reduce international fric-
tion by integrating national economies into a global economy of 
mutual dependency. But a good international agreement on com-
petition policy may increase political tensions in both the near and 
long term. Again, the experience to date with the WTO dispute 
settlement process provides ample support for the view that closer 
economic integration is not a course that always runs smooth. 
Should non-enforcement of national competition laws constitute 
GATT nullification or impairment? Is a WTO panel competent to 
judge what constitutes an appropriate exercise of discretion by 
national antitrust enforcement agencies? The WTO lacks the 
authority and competence to adjudicate individual competition 
cases and to enforce antitrust laws.86 The obstacles to reaching a 
multilateral agreement on conduct deemed anti-competitive, cou-
pled with the difficulties of presenting sufficient evidence in a 
WTO panel proceeding, would undermine the integrity and 
acceptance of the results of the WTO dispute settlement process. 
Clear, bright-line legal standards of what is or is not a prohibited 
anti-competitive practice are an absolute necessity if the WTO is to 
assume the role of global antitrust adjudicator. That kind of global 
86. See James Rill, Comments, in BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM: 1998, at 382. 
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consensus across a broad spectrum of RBPs, however, is not even 
on the distant horizon. 
Assuming that an adequately robust and credible dispute setde-
ment process exists or can be fashioned at the WTO to resolve 
trade-related competition law disputes, do the WTO members have 
the will to abide by adverse dispute setdement decisions? Given the 
WTO's track record to date of panel and Appellate Body reports 
being ignored by the losing WTO member, the precondition of a 
robust and credible dispute settlement mechanism has not been 
satisfied. It is ironic that the chief advocate of a WTO competition 
policy agreement, the EU, is also the WTO member with arguably 
the worst record of compliance with WTO panel and Appellate 
Body rulings. The EU has raised the practice of foot dragging to an 
art form given its record of non-compliance with the WTO's rul-
ings in the Bananas and Hormone Beef disputes.87 Its decision to 
bring WTO dispute settlement proceedings challenging the U.S. 
Antidumping Act of 1916 and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 
has been nothing short of reckless. In fairness to the EU, the same 
could be said of the United States in bringing the Bananas com-
plaint in the first place. The incessant bickering between the 
United States and the EU has put tremendous stress on the WTO 
dispute setdement mechanism. 
As an alternative to binding dispute resolution, it has been sug-
gested that simply exposing anti-competitive business practices is 
itself sufficient to bring about a change in firm behavior. In Swe-
den, for example, under its 1946 competition law, enforcement 
authorities had investigatory powers and could announce their 
findings, but had no authority to prosecute violators. Making infor-
mation about these firms and their RBPs public was deemed suffi-
cien t to convince them to respect the law and desist from their 
anti-competitive practices.88 In short, the most effective policy for 
87. See Danie) Pruzin, EU Initiates WTO Complaint Against U.S. Carousel Retaliation, 17 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 884,884 Gune 8, 2000); Joe Kirwin & Gary G. Yerkey, EU Proposes 
Amended Legislation to Outlaw Growth Hormone; Seeks Lifting of Sanctions, 17 Int') Trade Rep. 
(BNA) 854, 854 Gune 1, 2000); US7R Steps Up Pressure on EU to Comply with Beef and Banana 
Rulings, 17 Int') Trade Rep. (BNA) 853, 853 Gune 1, 2000); Jane Winebrenner, No Progress 
Made at EU-U.S. Summit on FSC Proposal, Beef, and Bananas, )7 Int') Trade Rep. (BNA) 852, 
852 (June 1,2000); Gary G. Yerkey, Farmers Urge USTR to Hit New Countries in Disputes with 
Europe over Beef, Bananas, 17 Int') Trade Rep. (BNA) 884,884 (June 1, 2000). 
88. See Yves Bourdet, Policy Toward Market Power and Restrictive Practices, in INTERNATION-
ALIZATION, MARKET POWER AND CONSUMER WELFARE 301 (Yves Bourdet ed., 1992). 
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combating RBPs may be a policy of competition advocacy that pro-
motes transparency, rather than competition enforcement.89 
The seventh condition concerns some meeting of the minds on 
the issue of merger control. Having more than one jurisdiction 
examine the anti-competitive effects of a merger increases the 
transactions costs of the parties and adds to legal uncertainty. One 
of the rationales for the 1989 EV Merger Control Regulation was 
to eliminate the transaction costs associated with multiple filings 
with EV-member state antitrust enforcement authorities by giving 
the European Commission exclusive jurisdiction over mergers with 
a "Community dimension."90 At a minimum the costs of pre-
merger reporting and notification requirements are increased 
because firms are required to make multiple filings with several 
different competition authorities under penalty of fines and other 
sanctions. Just how onerous these multiple pre-merger notification 
filings are is the subject of some anecdotal dispute. Although it 
may not be true across the board, firms engaged in large M&As will 
generally be sophisticated enough to retain knowledgeable counsel 
for whom multiple pre-merger filings are routine. Of course, being 
routine does not mean cost-free. But as a percentage of the deal, 
the transaction costs associated with multiple pre-merger notifica-
tions are de minimis. Moreover, given that national competition 
authorities will be asking precisely the same questions of the par-
ties in most cases, the same information that is collected for com-
pleting one pre-merger notification can be used for all others. 
The legal uncertainty associated with multiple M&A filings 
presents a concern of a slightly different dimension. It is possible 
that one national authority will approve a proposed merger uncon-
ditionally, while another will impose conditions or reject it alto-
gether. The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger illustrates the 
point, with the Federal Trade Commission giving its unconditional 
approval to the merger, and the European Commission balking 
unless Boeing agreed to several conditions. Overlapping jurisdic-
tion because of extraterritorial enforcement of competition law 
not only can create legal uncertainty, but can also be a source of 
political friction. That said, it does not necessarily follow that the 
only possible solution to this predicament is a multilateral one in 
89. See Jose Tavares de Araujo. & Luis Tineo, The Harmonization of Competition Policies 
Among MercosuT Countries, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 441, 443 (1998). 
90. In the first recital of its preamble, the Merger Control Regulation provides that 
multiple notification of the same transaction increases legal uncertainty, effort and cost for 
companies, and may lead to conflicting assessments. 1997 OJ. (L 180) 1; Council Regula-
tion 4064/89, 1989 ?J. (L 395) 1, as amended, 1990 OJ. (L 257) 13. 
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the form of a WTO competition policy agreement. The cure of a 
multilateral mechanism for resolving such conflicts may be worse 
than the disease. The heavy mix of law and policy when national 
authorities evaluate a merger implicates deep-rooted feelings of 
national sovereignty. Reformers ignore this inconvenient fact at 
their peril. 
Rather than reach for a multilateral solution, bilateral solutions 
that take the form of mutual cooperation agreements, or unilateral 
solutions in the form of comity and wise self-restraint, are immedi-
ately "doable." For example, when Congress enacted the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, amending the 
Sherman Act and requiring pre-merger notification, the law was 
essentially unlimited in its jurisdictional reach. Subsequent regula-
tions tempered the Act's reach by introducing principles of comity 
in the exercise of jurisdiction under the Act.9l Bilateral and unilat-
eral solutions also take better account of the legal and political 
realities that a multilateral solution either ignores or papers over. 
The eighth condition is a consensus that responsibility for inter-
national competition policy should be taken out of the hands of 
national competition enforcement authorities and placed in the 
hands of trade officials. Taking such a step would have profound 
consequences for competition policy. Although the purposes of 
trade and competition policy are broadly the same-to open mar-
kets, enhance efficiencies, and increase world wealth-the two 
bodies of law and their underlying policies are not entirely congru-
ent. To cite just one example, trade policy officials may deem as 
unlawful all vertical restraints that block or impede market access 
without asking, as would national antitrust enforcement authori-
ties, whether such restraints create efficiencies that, on balance, 
maximize consumer welfare. The U.S.-japan Film dispute is a case in 
point that demonstrates this policy disconnect.92 
V. MAINTAIN THE STATUS Quo? 
Of the options available at the WTO with regard to competition 
policy-a minimum standards agreement on competition policy, a 
framework agreement on competition policy, the introduction of 
more competition principles into existing WTO agreements, or 
maintaining the status quo-the option that seems the most sensi-
91. See 43 Fed. Reg. 33,497 (1978). 
92. See generally William H. Barringer, Competition Policy and Cross Border Dispute Resolu-
tion: Lessons Learned from the U.S.Japan Film Dispute, 6 GEO. MAsON L. REv. 459 (1998) (dis-
cllssing the Kodak Section 301 case and the WTO case filed by the United States). 
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ble at present is to maintain the status quo. In support of maintain-
ing the status quo, it can be argued that the WTO's priorities 
should be on removing government barriers to trade, including 
restrictions on foreign direct investment. Trade and investment lib-
eralization, the argument runs, are the most powerful pro-competi-
tive instruments immediately available to the WTO. A WTO 
agreement on competition policy could be a solution in search of a 
problem. With the exception of the US.-Japan Film dispute, the 
absence of competition law issues in GATT-WTO jurisprudence 
implies that anti-competitive practices are not a significant issue in 
the context of international trade and market access.93 
Moreover, the GATT-WTO system offers more to its members 
than just a forum for consulting inter se on the trade and competi-
tion policy relationship. Existing GATT-WTO instruments contain 
the bases for making legal challenges to private RBPs affecting 
trade. GATT Article XXIII:1 provides that a contracting party may 
initiate a dispute settlement proceeding if it: 
should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indi-
rectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or 
that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being 
impeded as the result of 
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its 
obligations under this Agreement, 
(b) the application by another contracting party of any mea-
sure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this 
Agreement, or 
(c) the existence of any other situation, ... 
The threshold question in determining which type of Article XXIII 
proceeding may properly be brought is whether the existence of 
private RBPs that restrict trade constitutes a violation of GATT 
199494 or of a WTO Agreement, or whether it instead comes under 
the heading of non-violation nullification or impairment. As 
explained more fully below, each type of Article XXIII: 1 proceed-
ing carries with it distinct procedures and remedies.95 
93. See]. Michael Finger & KC. Fung, CAN COMPETITION POLICY COr-.'TROL 301?, 49 
AUSSENWIRTSCHAFr 379,380 (1994) (analyzing complaint data from the mid-1980's to mid-
1990's and concluding that antitrust violations have not been a factor in the filing of Sec-
tion 301 petitions). 
94. GAIT 1994 consists collectively of the following legal instruments: GAIT 1947, as 
amended and modified; waivers granted under GAIT 1947 and still in force on the date of 
entry into force of the WTO Agreement; the Marrakesh Protocol, to which the WTO Mem-
bers schedules of market access commitments are appended; and the six Uruguay Round 
Understandings included in Annex lA that amend and clarity GAIT 1947. 
95. See Sungjoon Cho, GAIT Non-Violation Issues in the WTO Framewrnk: Are They the 
Achilles Heel of the Dispute Settlement Process? 39 fuRY. INT'L LJ. 311, 328 (1998) (analyzing 
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A. Article XXIII:l(a) Nullification or Impairment Complaints 
Outside of the specific contexts of a WTO agreement with com-
petition law commitments96, a WTO member would have a diffi-
cult, if not impossible, task of establishing that another member 
has violated GATT by failing to enact competition laws or to 
enforce its competition laws. No specific provision of GATT 1994 
imposes a general obligation on WTO members to enact, maintain, 
or enforce a national competition law. Nevertheless, there are sev-
eral situations in which a WTO member could be found to be in 
violation of a GATT 1994 article or one of the WTO agreements 
with competition policy provisions. 
First, if a WTO member has authorized a private firm to act as an 
import monopoly, such a monopoly would violate GATT Article 
II:4 if it treated imports in such a way "so as to afford protection on 
the average in excess of the amount of protection provided for" in 
the member's tariff binding for that imported product. Thus, for 
example, if an import monopoly were to mark-up the price of 
imported goods on grounds other than "normal commercial con-
siderations," such a price mark-up would violate Article II:4,97 
regardless of whether the imports were still competitive with the 
like domestic product despite the price mark-up. 
Could an import cartel or an exclusive distribution network be 
found to violate Article II:4? Recall that Article II:4 provides, "[i]f 
any contracting party establishes, maintains or authorizes, formally 
or in effect, a monopoly of the importation of any product . . . 
[emphasis added]." If an import cartel or exclusive distribution 
network refused to deal in the goods of foreign producers or 
exporters, and a contracting party failed to take action against the 
cartel or network, would not the toleration of that anti-competitive 
activity violate Article II:4? Despite the fact that there would be an 
absence of formal government authorization of the anti-competi-
tive activity, the importing country's toleration of that activity 
would in effect establish, authorize, or maintain an import monop-
Article XXIII: I); Hudec, supra note 23, at 89-91. A majority of the members of the Interna-
tional Competition Policy Advisory Committee believes that the WTO as a forum for review 
of private REPs is not constructive. See INT'L COMPETITION POL'y REP., supra note 50, at 274. 
96. Examples of such agreements include the TRIPS Agreement and its provisions, an 
abuse of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in licensing agreements or the GATS and the 
competition policy principles agreed to in the Reference Paper to the Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications. 
97. See Report of the GATT Panel, Canada? Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain 
Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, Feb. 18, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th 
Supp.) at 27, 85-86 paras. 4.5-4.8. 
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oly. The cartel's or distribution network's refusal to deal would be 
the functional equivalent of a trade-prohibitive tariff, and would 
clearly frustrate the benefit of the bargain reflected in the tariff 
binding listed in the importing member's schedule of tariff conces-
sions. The language of Article 11:4 is certainly broad enough to 
include types of "protection" other than price mark-ups ("such 
monopoly shall not ... operate so as to afford protection on the aver-
age in excess of the amount of protection provided for in that 
Schedule" [emphasis added]). In this connection, the Interpreta-
tive Note to Article 11:4 is instructive. It states that Article 11:4 is to 
be interpreted in light of the provisions of Article 31 of the Havana 
Charter. Article 31.5 provides that import monopolies are to 
import and offer for sale such quantities of the product as are suffi-
cient to satisfY the full domestic demand for the imported product. 
Therefore, the obligations of Article 11:4 arguably cover conduct 
that denies imported goods the opportunity to compete with 
domestic goods.98 
Second, the national treatment obligation of GATT Article 111:4 
requires that imported products receive treatment no less 
favorable than the like domestic product in connection with 
national "laws, regulations or requirements affecting their internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or 
use ... [emphasis added]." It is worth recalling that the GATT 
drafters did not use the word "governing," implying that Article 
111:4 covers laws and regulations that might adversely affect the 
conditions of competition between the domestic and imported 
products in the internal market. Competition law obviously is such 
a national law, regulation, or requirement within the meaning of 
Article 111:4.99 Article 111:4 could, therefore, be the basis of an Arti-
cle XXIII: 1 (a) complaint if an importing country's competition 
laws discriminated against imported goods vis-a-vis the like domes-
tic product either de facto (a measure that in its application upsets 
the competitive relationship between domestic and imported 
goods as it existed at the time when a relevant tariff concession was 
98. See, e.g., Report of the GAlT Panel, Republic of Korea B Restrictions on Imports 
of Beef, Nov. 7. 1989, GAlT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 202, 300 para. 106 (advising that an 
import monopoly was not to charge on the average a profit margin which was higher than 
that which would be obtained under normal conditions of competition in the absence of 
the monopoly). 
99. See Repon of the \\'TO Panel, United States Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/ 
DSI62/R, para. 6.269 (2000) (ruling that the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 is an internal law 
within the scope of Article "':4) [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 Dispute]. 
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granted) or de jure (a measure that on its face discriminates against 
im ported products). 100 
The subject matter of the complaint would not be private anti-
competitive behavior, but rather the discriminatory application of 
national competition law to imports compared to domestic prod-
ucts in a manner that upsets the competitive relationship between 
the two. As noted earlier, Article III does not employ a trade effects 
test; instead, the inquiry is whether national legislation upsets 
"effective equality of competitive opportunities."101 Such discrimi-
nation covers not only the substantive provisions of competition 
law, but also its procedural provisions. Thus, for example, if a 
country's competition law gave domestic firms a right to file a pri-
vate antitrust lawsuit against anti-competitive conduct within their 
national market, but denied such a right to foreign firms whose 
exports to that market were being blocked by anti-competitive 
behavior within that market, a prima facie case of GATT nullifica-
tion or impairment would be made out under Article 111:4. 
Similarly, if competition laws were enacted that targeted foreign 
firms and their imported products, but without any parallellegisla-
tion in place targeting domestic firms, an Article 111:4 claim might 
exist. In the 2000 panel and Appellate Body reports on United 
States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,102 the EU andJapan complained 
that the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 violates Article 111:4, inter alia, 
because imported products could be the subject of a U.S. legal pro-
ceeding alleging price discrimination under a trade law remedy 
(i.e., the antidumping duty law103), or under a competition law 
remedy (i.e., the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916104), whereas domestic 
firms could only be subject to an action for price discrimination 
under the Robinson-Patman Act. 105 In addition, the EU and Japan 
claimed that the 1916 Act violates Article 111:4 of GATT 1994 to the 
extent that it provides less favorable treatment to imported goods 
than is granted to U.S. goods under the Robinson-Patman Act in 
terms of the difference in (1) pleading requirements, (2) the use 
100. See Report of the V,rTO Panel, Japan Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic 
Film and Paper, \\,T /DS44/R, para. 10.20 (adopted Apr. 22, 1998) [hereinafter U.S.:/apan 
Film Dispute]. 
101. [d. 
102. See Report of the wro Panel, United States Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/ 
DS162/R (2000); Report of the Appellate Body, United States Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, 
\\,T/DSI36/AB/R, WT/DSI62/AB/R (2000). 
103. See 19 U.S.c. §§ 1673-1673g (1988). 
104. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-74 (1994). 
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994). 
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of the intent requirement in the 1916 Act instead of a requirement 
of "effect" under the Robinson-Patman Act, (3) the cost recoup-
ment requirement, (4) the statutory defenses available under the 
Robinson-Patman Act and not expressly provided for in the 1916 
Act, anc~ (5) the conduct subject to penalties. 106 
In exercising the principle of judicial economy, the panel and 
the Appellate Body disposed of the dispute in favor of the EU and 
Japan on other grounds and declined to examine the question 
whether the 1916 Act violates the national treatment obligation. 107 
Nevertheless, the 1989 GATT panel report in Section 337 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930 is instructive and strongly suggests that the EU and 
Japan had a compelling Article III:4 claim. 
Following a complaint by the European Community, in January 
1989, a GATT panel issued a report in which it agreed with the EC 
that Section 337108 violated the national treatment obligation of 
GATT Article. III:4. The panel found that Section 337 discrimi-
nated against imported articles vis-a-vis the domestic like product 
in six respects. 109 First, a Section 337 complainant had a choice of 
two fora-the International Trade Commission or federal district 
court-in which to challenge imported articles that allegedly 
infringed IPRs, whereas articles manufactured domestically in the 
United States could only be challenged in federal court. Second, 
foreign producers and importers of challenged products were at a 
potential disadvantage vis-a-vis their U.S. domestic counterparts, 
given the strict time limits applicable in Section 337 proceedings, 
with no corresponding time limits applicable in federal court. 
actions. Third, a Section 337 respondent could not bring a coun-
terclaim (e.g., a counterclaim alleging an antitrust violation by the 
complainant for abusing its exclusive rights under a patent, trade-
mark, or copyright), whereas a federal court defendant had that 
option. Fourth, relief in the form of a general exclusion order 
against infringing imports was available in a Section 337 proceed-
ing. In contrast, no corresponding remedy was available against 
infringing articles of U.S,. origin in a federal court proceeding. 
Fifth, exclusion orders were automatically enforced by the U.S. 
Customs Service, whereas any injunctive relief ordered by a federal 
court in a private civil action required for its enforcement separate 
106. See Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 Dispute, supra note 99, para. 6.7. 
107. See id. paras. 6.270-6.272. 
108. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.c. § 1337(a}. 
109. See Report of the GAlT Panel, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 
1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GAlT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 391 para. 5.20. 
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contempt proceedings brought by the successful plaintiff. Sixth, 
foreign producers and importers of challenged imports faced the 
prospect of defending parallel or successive administrative and 
judicial proceedings. In contrast, products of U.S. origin were not 
exposed to the same gauntlet. IIO 
The panel recommended that the United States amend Section 
337 to remedy the inconsistencies with Article III:4. Although it 
took over six years, Congress finally did amend Section 337 in 
December 1994 to remedy the national treatment violations. I I I 
Applying the GAIT panel's analysis to the Anti-Dumping Act of 
1916, given that a domestic firm facing below-cost import competi-
tion has available two fora in which to proceed against such 
imported goods (i.e., an administrative as well as judicial forum), 
whereas below-cost, domestically-produced goods can only be the 
subject of legal proceedings filed in a judicial forum, the EU and 
Japan certainly had a colorable national treatment claim against 
the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916. Moreover, if, as alleged, the Anti-
Dumping Act of 1916 subjects foreign defendants accused of price 
discrimination to more onerous legal requirements compared to 
similarly circumstanced domestic defendants accused of price dis-
crimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, then such a disparity 
in competitive conditions would likewise draw into question 
whether the 1916 Act is consistent with the national treatment 
obligation.112 
There is a third situation in which a WTO member could be 
found in violation of a GATT 1994 Article. If the WTO member's 
toleration or encouragement of an import monopoly, import car-
tel, or exclusive distribution network could be the basis for a GAIT 
complaint under Article III:4, then the government's toleration or 
encouragement of a private export cartel could likewise be the 
basis of a GATT Article XXIII: 1 (a) complaint pursuant to Article 
XI, which prohibits import and export quotas. Assume that a group 
of firms within a country manufacture the same product for which 
llO. Id. 
111. See F. David Foster & Joel Davidow, GAIT and &form of u.s. Section 337, 30 1"'T'L 
LAw. 97 (1996) (assessing the 1994 amendments to Section 337); Tom M. Schaumberg, A 
Revitaliud Section 337 to Prohibit Unfairly Traded Imports, in THE GAIT, THE "'''TO AND THE 
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS Acr 487 (1995). 
1] 2. A more difficult case to prove, but one which would implicate a national treat-
ment violation as well, would be one claiming that national competition law enforcement 
authorities have exercised their discretionary enforcement authority in a discriminatory 
manner by bringing price discrimination cases against foreign exporters, while consistently 
declining to investigate or institute proceedings against domestic firms accused of the same 
or similar anti-competitive conduct in the domestic market. 
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the supply is insufficient to meet total world demand. They agree 
on their respective market shares and to limit the supply of the 
product exported to foreign markets in order to keep prices artifi-
cially high and thereby reap supranormal profits. National antitrust 
enforcement authorities might not have sufficie'nt incentive to take 
action against the export cartel, so long as consumer welfare in 
their country is not being reduced. Would the failure of national 
antitrust enforcement authorities to break up the export cartel vio-
late the Article XI prohibition on quantitative restrictions? 
Article XI: 1 is directed at governmental restrictions or prohibi-
tions on imports or exports, "whether made effective through quo-
tas, import or export licenses or other measures." It does not 
discipline purely private conduct. A distinction could be drawn 
between government toleration of export cartel activity and gov-
ernment encouragement of such activity. While the former might 
successfully escape challenge under Article XI: 1, the latter could 
be the basis for a GATT complaint. The 1988 GATT panel in Trade 
in Semi-Conductors ruled that "measures" include government con-
duct that is not legally binding or mandatory. In determining that 
"administrative guidance" from the Japanese government to Japa-
nese exporters of semi-conductors was a "measure" for purposes of 
Article XI: 1, the panel recognized that not all non-mandatory gov-
ernmental requests to restrict exports could be regarded as mea-
sures within the meaning of Article XI:1. "Government-industry 
relations varied from country to country, from industry to industry, 
and from case to case and were influenced by may factors. There 
was thus a wide spectrum of government involvement ranging 
from, for instance, direct government orders to occasional govern-
ment consultations with advisory committees,"113 the panel noted. 
The reach of the Semi-Conductors ruling was tested in the U.S.-
japan Film dispute. The United States did not allege that japan's 
toleration of allegedly anti-competitive behavior by private actors 
violated GATT. Instead, the United States argued that Japan pro-
moted the establishment of the exclusive distribution network for 
film.114 The United States attempted to link several seemingly 
unrelated acts by the Japanese government as proof of an Article 
XI:1 "measure." While the panel did not fault the United States' 
legal argument, it was unable to make a connection between the 
113. See Report of the GAIT Panel, Japan-Trade in Semi-Conductors, May 4, 1988, 
GAIT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 116, 154 para. 108. 
114. See U.S.-Japan Film Dispute, supra note 100, at paras. 6.243-6.247,6.609-6.612,10.22. 
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acts of the Japanese government and the establishment of the 
exclusive distribution network. lIS 
In light of the Semi-Conductors case, active government encour-
agement in the form of legislation that immunizes the hypothetical 
export cartel from competition law scrutiny would arguably be a 
"measure" that violates Article XI:l. Article XI:l, however, speaks 
in terms of affirmative government conduct that restricts or pro-
hibits exports. Therefore, unless the mere acquiescence in such 
cartel activity would qualify as a "measure," government toleration 
of or acquiescence in an export cartel that divided markets and 
restricted the supply of its products for export to foreign markets 
would not violate Article XI: 1. GATT 1994 generally limits govern-
ments in the action they may take to restrict trade flows, and does 
not impose on them an affirmative obligation to take positive steps 
to promote trade flows. 
Fourth, GATT 1994 and other WTO agreements direct WTO 
members to restrict the activities of monopolies in at least four situ-
ations when those monopolies abuse their dominant position by 
restricting or preventing market access: 
l. Private import or export monopolies established under 
GATT Article XVII. 
Article XVII does not prohibit a member from establishing 
import or export monopolies, but it does regulate their operation 
and effects on trade when they make purchases or sales. Although 
no GATT or WTO panel has ever found a measure to be in viola-
tion of Article XVII itself, GATT panels have found that Article 
XVII state trading enterprises have violated the Article XI prohibi-
tion on import or export quotas and the national treatment obliga-
tion. 116 Article XVII: 1 (b) also requires government-authorized 
import and export monopolies to "afford enterprises of the other 
contracting parties adequate opportunity, in accordance with cus-
tomary business practice, to compete for participation in [the 
monopoly's] purchases or sales." Thus, a WTO member that has 
authorized a private import or export monopoly could be found to 
be in violation of GATT if it allowed such a monopoly to, in effect, 
115. See id. at paras. 10.39, 10.204. 
116. See, e.g., Report of the GATT Panel, Canada Import, Distribution and Sale of Alco-
holic Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies, Mar. 22. 1988, GATT B.I.S.D., 
(35th Supp.) 37,90 para. 4. (finding a violation of Article XI); Report of the GATT Panel, 
Republic of Korea Restrictions on Imports of Beef, Nov.7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th 
Supp.) at 268, 301-02 paras. 114-15 (finding a violation of Article XI). 
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abuse its dominant position by acting in a manner inconsistent 
with the Article 1 most-favored-nation obligation or the national 
treatment obligation of Article 111.117 
2. GATS competition policy commitments. 
The few instances where a WTO member has an affirmative obli-
gation to take action against private anti-competitive behavior are 
to be found in the GATS 'and its subsidiary agreements. 
a. Abuse of dominant position by monopoly service suppliers 
generally. 
GATS Article VIII, Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers, obli-
gates members to ensure that any monopoly services supplier in its 
territory, whether public or private, does not act in a manner 
inconsistent with the GATS Article II MFN requirement, that is, it 
does not discriminate among foreign firms in the provision of ser-
vices. That Article further requires that, with respect to services sec-
tors covered in a member's schedule of market access 
commitments, members ensure that when a monopoly supplier, or 
an exclusive service supplier whose rights are granted by the gov-
ernment, compete in the supply of a service outside the scope of 
their government-granted rights, they do not abuse their monop-
oly position by acting in a manner inconsistent with that member's 
commitments on national treatment and market access for foreign 
service suppliers. 1 IS The operative phrase in Article VIII is "[ e] ach 
117. See, e.g., Report of the GAIT Panel, Canada-Import, Distribution and Sale of 
Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, Feb. 18, 1992, GAIT B.I.S.D. 
(39th Supp.) at 27, 85 paras. 5.31; Report of the GAIT Panel, Thailand Restrictions on 
Importation of and National Taxes on Cigarettes, 1990, GAIT B.LS.D. (37th Supp.) at 
200, 223-26 paras. 76-81. Arguments have also been made that the national treatment com-
mitment is incorporated by reference in Article XVII. GAIT panels, however, have either 
declined to rule that the national treatment obligation is part of Article XVII or have sug-
gested that it is not. See, e.g., Report of the GAIT Panel, Belgian Family Allowances, Nov. 7, 
1952, GAIT B.LS.D. (1st Supp.) at 59,60 para. 4 (finding that national treatment obliga-
tion is not part of Article XVII); Report of the GAIT Panel, Canada, Import, Distribution 
and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies, Mar. 22, 1988, 
GAIT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 37, 90 para. 4.27 (disposing of the complaint on other 
grounds). 
118. Article VIII provides in part: 
1. Each Member shall ensure that any monopoly supplier of a service in its terri-
tory does not, in the supply of the monopoly service in the relevant market, 
act in a manner inconsistent with that Member's obligations under Article II 
[the MFN commitment] and specific [market access] commitments; 
2. Where a Member's monopoly supplier competes, either directly or through 
an affiliated company, in the supply of a service outside the scope of its 
monopoly right and which is subject to that Member's specific commitments, 
the Member shall ensure that such a supplier does not abuse its monopoly 
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Member shall ensure," language that is mandatory, not hortatory. 
The failure to observe these Article VIII commitments could be the 
basis for an Article XXIII: 1 (a) nullification or impairment 
complaint. 
b. Abuse of dominant position by a monopoly service supplier 
in the basic telecommunications sector. 
Effective antitrust laws can be an immeasurable aid to investors 
by preventing local monopolies from abusing their position toward 
new entrants. This is especially true for network industries, such as 
basic telecoms, where an investor may have to rely on local trans-
mission facilities, typically owned by state monopolies, to provide a 
competitive service. The 1997 WTO Agreement on Basic Telecom-
munications contains important competition rules, the violation of 
which could be the basis for an Article XXIII: 1 (a) nullification or 
impairment complaint. The Negotiating Group on Basic Telecom-
munications developed a Reference Paper on competition princi-
ples that requires national telecom regulators to be established and 
to referee interconnection with former or existing telecom monop-
olies. In the context of a WTO member's duty to regulate anti-com-
petitive behavior, the Reference Paper contains two highly relevant 
provisions: (1) those WTO members that have agreed to the terms 
of the Reference Paper must maintain appropriate measures for 
the purpose of preventing specific anti-competitive practices by 
major suppliers, such as cross-subsidization, withholding technical 
and commercial information, or using information obtained from 
competitors with anti-competitive results; and (2) WTO members 
must ensure that interconnection is cost-based, timely, and on non-
discriminatory terms, rates, and quality. 
This second provision is probably the most important one affect-
ing market access because without interconnection, customers of 
one service supplier cannot communicate with customers of 
others. Although the Reference Paper identifies three types of con-
duct that may be anti-competitive-cross-subsidization, withhold-
ing technical information, and misusing competitors' 
information-it does not define the term "anti-competitive." In the 
case of anti-competitive cross-subsidization, for example, anti-com-
petitive behavior would presumably occur if a major service sup-
plier that has market power were to use the supranormal profits it 
earns from that segment of the market to sustain a loss-making 
position to act in its territory in a manner inconsistent with such 
commitments. 
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operation in a segment of the market where there is competition. 
This is only speculation, however. What would constitute anti-com-
petitive behavior in situations involving withholding technical 
information and misuse of competitors' information is not clear. In 
addition, the Reference Paper does not specifically obligate mem-
bers to prevent these anti-competitive practices, but only to adopt 
appropriate measures for the purpose of preventing them. This 
might put too fine a point on it. Without an obligation to take 
effective action to prevent these RBPs, the commitments made in 
the Reference Paper would ring very hollow indeed. GATT and 
WTq panels have seldom hesitated to give terms in GATT a gener-
ous reading that serves to promote the goal of market access. 
Commentators have suggested that in order for the Reference 
Paper to be effectively implemented, a necessary precondition is 
the conclusion of a WTO agreement on competition standards-in 
effect, a reference paper for the Reference Paper. 119 Others believe 
that such an auxiliary WTO competition principles agreement is 
not essential and place their faith in the ability of WTO panels to 
develop such competition principles. 120 Panels would draw from 
core competition law principles in ruling on whether private con-
duct is anti-competitive. In addressing private conduct where con-
sensus on competition law principles breaks down, panels would 
presumably be guided by the objectives of the Reference Paper and 
of the Basic Telecoms Agreement itself, which are market access. 
Professor Robert Hudec writes: 
Whatever the answers are [from WTO panels], they will only be 
answers for this one area of government-to-government legal 
relations, affecting only the private firms involved in that sector 
of the economy. There would seem to be no good reason why 
the answers given by dispute settlement panels would be any less 
acceptable than in any other area of WTO law. There is not 
threat here to the integrity, and sovereignty, of national compe-
tition laws. Just a slight dent, perhaps, in their pretensions as 
exclusive arbiter. 121 
This "one area of government-to-government legal relations, affect-
ing only the private firms involved in that sector of the economy," 
as Professor Hudec describes it, was a $600 billion industry in 1997 
and, by one estimate, is expected to double or triple over ten 
119. See Marco C.EJ. Bronckers & Pierre Larouche, Telecommunications Services and the 
World Trade Organization, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 26-28 (1997). 
120. See Hudec, supra note 23, at 93. 
121. Id. at 93-94. 
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years. 122 In 1999, world export trade in commercial services was 
$1.34 trillionJ23 His assessment may also underestimate the power 
of competition law enforcement authorities and their sensitivity to 
"turf' issues. And although he does not spell out what the objec-
tives of the Reference Paper are that would guide WTO panels in 
their formulation of competition law principles in non-core com-
petition policy areas, it is worth remembering that market access 
iiber alles is the trade policy mantra. Efficient markets in the service 
of consumer welfare is the competition policy pole star. This is a 
critical policy difference, one where trade policy and competition 
policy are a poor fit. The seeds of conflict may be sown if mediating 
this tension is left to WTO panels. 
c. Denial of market access to the financial services sector by 
government-authorized monopolies and other private 
organizations. 
Pursuant to the GATS Understanding on Commitments in 
Financial Services, members must list in their schedule of financial 
services commitments eXIstmg monopoly rights and "shall 
endeavor to eliminate them or reduce their scope."124 Regarding 
national treatment violations by private organizations, when mem-
bership or participation in any self-regulatory body, securities or 
futures exchange, or any other organization is required by a mem-
ber as a condition of supplying a particular financial service on an 
equal footing with resident financial service suppliers, members 
must ensure that such entities accord national treatment to non-
resident financial service suppliers. 125 
These are two of the rare instances where GATT-WTO provisions 
impose an affirmative competition policy obligation on WTO 
members to ensure market access by eliminating or reducing the 
market power of financial services monopolies, public or private, 
and to ensure that foreign financial services suppliers have access 
to membership in private exchanges and other self-regulatory 
bodies. 
122. See Statement of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Basic Telecom Negotiations, 
Feb. 17, 1997, available at http://www.ustr.gov/agreements/telecom/barshefsky.html (last 
visited April 22, 2000) (noting that today's $600 billion industry will double or even triple 
over the next ten years under this agreement). 
123. See 1999 WORLD TRADE ORG. ANN. REp. 9 (2000). 
124. Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiatons, GATT Trade Negotia-
tions Committee Doc. MTN/FA III-7(e) (Apr. 15, 1994). 
125. See id. 
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3. Abuse of intellectual property rights. 
Articles 8 and 40 of the TRIPS Agreement permit WTO mem-
bers to take action against licensing practices that restrain competi-
tion and other measures against the abuse of intellectual property 
rights, respectively. The TRIPS Agreement, however, does not 
require the adoption of laws to prevent such abuses. If a member 
has such competition laws and proceeded against what it consid-
ered to be an abuse of TRIPS, another member would have a basis 
for an Article XXIII: 1 (a) complaint if the member's measures are 
inconsistent with the other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. 126 
B. A rticle XXIII: 1 (b) Non-Violation Nullification or 
Impairment Complaints 
Although the overwhelming majority of GATT and WTO panel 
proceedings involve alleged breaches of GATT-WTO legal obliga-
tions, a WTO member may nevertheless complain that GATT bene-
fits that were to accrue to it have been nullified or impaired 
because of GATT-legal conduct by another member or of any other 
situation. Although the non-violation remedy is an important and 
accepted tool of WTO-GATT dispute settlement for over 50 years, 
few non-violation cases have been decided and those that have 
been have all been decided under Article XXIII: 1 (b), none under 
Article XXIII: 1 (c) .127 This suggests that both the GATT con tracting 
parties and WTO members have approached this remedy with cau-
tion and, indeed, have treated it as an exceptional instrument of 
dispute settlement. The panel reports in the EEC-Oilseeds case and 
the US.Japan Film dispute confirm that the non-violation nullifica-
tion or impairment remedy should be approached with caution 
126. See TRIPS Agreement art. 8, supra note 47, 33 I.L.M. at 87. 
127. There have been nine cases in which panels or working parties have substantively 
considered Article XXIII: 1 (b) claims. See Report of the GATT Panel, United 
States - Agricultural Waiver, BISD, Nov. 7, 1990, (37th Supp.) at 228; Report of the GATT 
Panel, EEC - Oilseeds, Jan. 25, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86; Report of the 
GATT Panel, Japan - Trade in Semi-conductors, May 4,1988 GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 
116; Report of the GATT Panel, EC -Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products from 
Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region, GATT Doc. L/5576 (unadopted, Feb. 7, 
1985); Report of the GATT Panel, EEC - Production Aids Granted on Canned Peaches, 
Canned Pears, Canned Fruit Cocktail and Dried Grapes, GATT Doc. L/5778 (unadopted, 
Feb. 20, 1985); Report of the GATT Panel, Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, Nov. 16, 
1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (llth Supp.) at 95; Report of the GATT Panel, Treatment by Ger-
many ofImports of Sardines, Oct. 31, 1952, GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 53; Report of the 
Working Party, Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Apr. 3, 1950, GATT B.I.S.D. 
11/188; U.S.Japan Film Dispute, supra note 100; see also Cho, supra note 95, at 316-21; Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, Violation Complaints and Non-Violation Complaints in Public International 
Trade Law, 34 GERMANY.B. INT'L L. 175, 192 (1991). 
HeinOnline -- 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 640 2000-2001
640 The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. [Vol. 33 
and treated as an exceptional concept. 128 The reason for this cau-
tion is straightforward: members negotiate the rules that they agree 
to follow and only exceptionally would expect to be' challenged for 
actions not in contravention of those rules. 
A claim of Article XXIII: 1 (b) non-violation nullification or 
impairment has three elements. A complaint must allege that(l) 
benefits accruing to the complaining member under GATT or a 
WTO Agreement have been (2) nullified or impaired (3) "by the 
application of another contracting party of any measure," although 
that measure is not prohibited under GATT or any WTO Agree-
ment. The complaining party must supmit a detailed justification 
in support of its complaint. 129 In GATT practice, non-violation nul-
lification or impairment claims have arisen where a country that 
made a tariff concession thereafter acted in a way that frustrated 
the reasonable expectations of market access created by the con-
cession. I30 The reasonable expectations element is a temporal ele-
ment: a comparison must be made of the competitive relationship 
between the domestic and imported products at the time when a 
relevant tariff concession was made and at the current time. In 
order for a non-violation claim to succeed, the action taken by the 
responding member could not have been reasonably anticipated 
by the complaining member at the time the concession was first 
negotiated. I31 
The formal remedy available for an Article XXIII: 1 (b) proceed-
ing differs slightly from the remedy available under Article 
128. In EEC - Oilseeds, the United States stated that it "concurred in the proposition 
that non-violation nullification or impainnent should remain an exceptional concept. 
Although this concept had been in the text of Article XXIII of the General Agreement 
from the outset, a cautious approach should continue to be taken in applying the con-
cept." Report of the GAlT Panel, EEC - Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors of 
Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Feb. 25,1990, GAlT B.LS.D. (37th Supp.) at 
86, 118 para. 114. The EEC in that case stated that "recourse to the 'non-violation' concept 
under Article XXIII:l(b) should remain exceptional, since otherwise the trading world 
would be plunged into a state of precariousness and uncertainty." [d. para. 113. See U.S.-
Japan Film Dispute, supra note 100, para. 10.36; see also EDMOND MCGoVERN, INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE REGULATION 2.27, 2.27-1 (noting that if all of these provisions were taken 
literally their potential scope would be enonnous). 
129. See WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, art. 26.1 (a), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, Apr. 15, 
1994,33 LL.M. 1125, 1127 [hereinafter DSUj. 
130. See Report of the GAlT Panel, EEC-Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors 
and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990, GAlT 
B.LS.D. (37th Supp.) at 86 para. 148; 2 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANALYTICAL INDEX: 
GUIDE TO GAlT LAw AND PRACTICE 657-68 (1995). 
131. See U.S.:Japan Film Dispute, supra note 100, at para. 10.76. 
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XXIII: 1 (a). The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
provides special procedures applicable to disputes involving non-
violation nullification or impairment complaints. Under DSU Arti-
cle 26.1, following a successful Article XXIII: 1 (b) complaint, the 
panel or Appellate Body is to recommend that the parties reach a 
~utually satisfactory adjustment of their dispute. The losing party 
is under no obligation to withdraw the offending measure or prac-
tice, but it must make "a mutually satisfactory adjustment" and 
compensation may be part of the final settlement.l32 A successful 
Article XXIII: 1 (b) complainant is thus entitled to compensation 
and may retaliate if suitable compensation is not forthcoming. 133 
A generalized Article XXIII: 1 (b) complaint that a member's fail-
ure to maintain or enforce its competition law has left unchecked 
private RBPs within that member's territory, which have prevented 
market access, probably would not be cognizable as an Article 
XVIII: 1 (b) claim. First, an Article XXIII: 1 (b) complainant must 
present "a detailed justification" in support of its claim that the 
responding member's measure has upset the competitive position 
of the imported products in issue. 134 The complainant must estab-
lish the existence of a concession and then identify specific, affirm-
ative conduct by another member-in the words of Article 
XVIII: 1 (b), "the application of another contracting party of any 
measure"-that has denied the complainant of the benefits of the 
concession, i.e., has put the imported products in issue at a com-
petitive disadvantage. Thus, a causal connection must be estab-
lished between the measure and the injury. 
Second, in proving nullification or impairment of a benefit in 
the context of private anti-competitive conduct, the complaining 
member would have to show that it had a reasonable expectation 
that at the time it negotiated trade concessions with the respond-
ing member, the responding member would enforce its competi-
tion laws to prevent private barriers to market access. 135 If the 
private barriers were known to exist at the time the trade conces-
sions were negotiated, however, then the complaining member is 
in effect estopped from raising them later on the ground that the 
complaining member should have specifically negotiated for their 
132. DSU art. 26.1(b), (d), supra note 109,33 LL.M. at 1127. 
133. See Hudec, supra note 23, at 90. It has also been suggested that a non-violation 
complaint proceeding can be a valuable transparency device. See Hoekman & Mavroidis, 
supra note 76, at 140-41. 
134. See MCGoVERN, supra note 128,2.27-5, 2.27-6. 
135. See, e.g., Report of the Working Party, Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, 
1952, GAIT B.LS.D. (1st Supp.). 
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removal at the earlier negotiations. I36 The burden is on the 
responding member to show that prejudice to the benefits of the 
concession could have been anticipated at the time the concession 
was negotiated. 
In evaluating whether a member's expectations are reasonable, 
the matter is straightforward at the polar extremes-the com-
plained-of measure was either in effect at the time the concession 
was negotiated or it was not even contemplated. In a panel pro-
ceeding involving facts in between these two extremes, a GATT 
panel concluded that because of public discussions during the 
Tokyo Round negotiations of EC tariff preferences for citrus prod-
ucts from Mediterranean countries, the United States must have 
been aware that the value of the tariff concessions it received from 
the EC for such products would be adversely affected. I37 In a varia-
tion on these facts, in the U.S.-japan Film dispute the panel con-
cluded that a measure that is introduced after the close of tariff 
negotiations is presumptively unanticipated, but this presumption 
can be rebutted if the responding member shows that the new 
measure was clearly contemplated on the basis of a measure in 
place prior to the negotiations. Measures introduced before the 
close of negotiations, however, give rise to the opposite presump-
tion. The complaining member is on notice of such measures from 
the date of their publication, and can only rebut the presumption 
by showing that it could not have reasonably anticipated their 
effect. 13S 
Regarding the third element, a "measure," the failure to investi-
gate or prosecute anti-competitive conduct within a member's ter-
ritory would not likely qualify as a "measure," unless that failure or 
refusal was based on a regulation or guideline promulgated by 
national enforcement authorities stating that certain conduct was 
exempt under the national competition laws. In this connection, 
the following statement by the panel in the u.s.-japan Film report is 
worth noting: "a Member's industrial policy, pursuing the goal of 
increasing efficiency in a sector, could in some circumstances upset 
the competitive relationship in the market between domestic and 
136. See Hudec, supra note 23, at 98-99 (noting that barriers cannot be considered a 
breach of expectations unless they were in fact not known at the time the bargain was 
actually made, on the theory that known hazards are always discounted in the prices paid 
in a deal). 
137. See Report of the GAIT Panel, EC -Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products 
from Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region, GAIT Doc. L/5576, para. 4.34 
(unadopted, Feb. 7, 1985). 
138. See U.S.:Japan Film Dispute, supra note 23, paras. 10.79-10.81, 10.103. 
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imported products in a way that could give rise to a cause of action 
under Article XXIII: 1 (b) ."139 The panel generally favored an 
expansive interpretation of the. term. The term "measure" is thus 
broader than the term "requirement" used in Article 111:4. Profes-
sor Hudec is undoubtedly correct when he states that "[d]oing 
nothing would not normally be considered a 'measure,' and on 
this point WTO tribunals are certain to require strict conformity 
with the words of the [non,.violation nullification or impairment] 
remedy, given its exceptional character."l40 
When, if ever, could government inaction give rise to an Article 
XXIII: 1 (b) non-violation complaint? 'Consider, first, GATT Article 
VI on dumping. It does not obligate members from whose territory 
dumped exports are shipped to prevent such dumping. l41 As a 
practical matter this makes' sense, given that it is only injurious 
dumping 'that is condem'ned. The country of importation is in a 
much better position to investigate and access the injurious impact 
of dumped imports than is the country of exportation. Neverthe-
less, Article VI:l does state that "contracting parties recognize that 
dumping .. ; is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material 
injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting 
party." Therefore, it is arguable that upon presentation of satisfac-
tory evidence by the importing member that such injurious dump-
ing is occurring or has occurred, an Article XXIII: 1 (b) case could 
be made. 
Next consider GATS Article IX, Business Practices. The Article 
provides in part that "certain business practices of service suppliers, 
other than the practices mentioned in Article VIII, may restrain 
competition and thereby restrict trade In services." Members are, 
therefore, under an obligation to enter into consultations with any 
other Member with a view to eliminating such RBPs. It also 
imposes a duty to cooperate by providing non-confidential infor-
mation of relevance to the matter in issue. Thus, analogous to the 
American labor law rule that employers have a duty to bargain with 
unions but no duty to agree, WTO members have a duty to consult 
and cooperate, but no duty to eliminate offending RBPs. 
139. Id. para. 10.38. 
140. Hudec, supra note 23, at 99. 
141. See Report of the GATT Panel, Canada Foreign Investtnent Review Act, Feb. 7, 
1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 140, 163 para. 5.18. 
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C. Article XXIII:l(c) Non-Violation Complaints. 
The other non-violation complaint provision, Article XXIII: 1 (c), 
permits a complaint to be brought if benefits accruing to a mem-
ber under GATT or a WTO agreement are being nullified or 
impaired "as the result of the existence of any other situation." A 
nullification or impairment complaint based a government's fail-
ure to take action against private RBPs could be the subject of an 
Article XXIII: 1 (c) complaint. 
As rare as Article XXIII: 1 (b) complaints are, Article XXIII: 1 (c) 
complaints are even more rare. An example of a GATT Article 
XXIII:1(c) situation is a 1983 complaint by the EC against Japan 
that the benefits of successive negotiations with Japan had not 
been realized due to factors peculiar to the Japanese economy that 
had allegedly resulted in a lower level of imports. The EC ulti-
mately did not pursue its complaint.142 
DSU Article 26.2 sets out special procedures applicable to GATT 
Article XXIII: 1 (c) complaints. The normal DSU procedures apply 
only up to the point where the panel report is circulated to the 
members. Beyond that point, the dispute settlement rules and pro-
cedures contained in the Decision of 12 April 1989 on Improve-
ments to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, 
apply to issues of adoption, surveillance, and implementation of 
recommendations.143 This means that in GATT Article XXIII: 1 (c) 
cases, there is no Appellate Body review, and the GATT 1947 prac-
tice of adoption of panel reports by consensus, as opposed to the 
DSU rule of rejection by consensus, applies. 144 
In the context of competition law complaints, as noted above, 
the failure or refusal of a member to either enact or enforce com-
petition laws would probably not qualify for an Article XXIII: 1 (b) 
complaint because the member has not engaged in any affirmative 
conduct. That failure or refusal would, however, certainly amount 
to "the existence of any other situation" under Article XXII: 1 (c). 
Resolving the issue of nullification or impairment of a GATT bene-
fit would require an examination of what the parties knew at the 
time they negotiated trade concessions about private conduct 
142. See GUIDE TO GATT LAw AND PRACTICE, supra note 130, at 670-7l. The only other 
Article XXIII:l(c) complaint is the Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, 1965, GAIT 
B.I.S.D. (13th Supp.) at 35, 45; Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, Nov. 16, 1962, 
GAIT B.I.S.D. (11th Supp.) at 95. 
143. Section 337 of The Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GAIT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 
6l. 
144. Compare id. para. l.3, with DSU art. 16.4, supra note 109, 33 I.L.M. at 1125. 
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restricting market access. It would be incumbent about the com-
plaining member to show that it had no knowledge of such anti-
competitive conduct and a reasonable expectation that none 
would occur to block market access on products for which it had 
successfully negotiated tariff concessions . 
.In either type of non-violation complaint, the resources and 
capacity of the. WIO dispute settlement mechanism would be 
severely tested. Competition law enforcement proceedings brought 
in national courts are prolix and expensive. Because the private 
parties themselves would not be on trial in a WIO dispute settle-
ment proceeding, many. due process guarantees could be dis-
pensed with in order to expedite the proceeding. Nevertheless, 
proving that private parties have violated competition laws can be a 
formidable task. Discovery, of confidential business information is 
facilitated in court proceedings through protective orders and the 
threat of contempt sanctions for violating that order. But what 
assurances would businesses have that their confidential informa-
tion would remain confidential if disclosed to a WIO panel? 
More importantly, what would the "reasonable expectations" 
standard be for showing nullification or impairment of a GATT 
benefit in either an Article XXIII:l (b) or (c) non-violation case? 
That the respo,nding member would enact and aggressively enforce 
competition laws? That it would enact such laws and make a good 
faith effort to enforce them? Either of these standards would make 
it difficult to prove a non-violation claim, for under either standard 
the responding member could successfully defend that it thor-
oughly investigated the RBP claim and found no cause to proceed. 
It has been suggested that the standard should be simply that an 
exporting country has a reasonable expectation that private barri-
ers to trade will not exist in export markets for which trade conces-
sions have been negotiated. 145 Even with this relaxed reasonable 
expectation standard, a complaining member would still have to 
prove the existence of a prohibited RBP. 
In the case of core competition law principles where consensus 
has been reached, such as hard-core horizontal restraints, there 
would be an agreed-upon legal norm against which the private con-
duct could be measured. But in the case of most vertical restraints, 
even when agreement exists on the governing legal standard, e.g., 
the rule of reason, reasonable minds can differ on whether a verti-
cal restraint is on balance pro-competitive or anti-competitive. Nev-
145. See Hudec, supra note 23, at 101. See generally Cho, supra note 95 (arguing that non-
violation cases should be abolished because they are not rules-based). 
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ertheless, the formidable proof problems would persist, once again 
drawing into question the capacity of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism to handle such disputes. In cases where consensus does 
not exist on the legal norms, how is a WIO panel to rule in the 
absence of a WTO agreement on competition policy? Yetthe pros~ 
pects for negotiating such an agreemeht appear dim. In the end, 
perhaps the best solution after all is to leave the resolution of inter-' 
national antitrust disputes to national antitrust enforcement 
authorities. 
A reasonable expectations standard that asks whether private 
RBPs in an export market are preventing market access looks like a 
no-fault approach to the issue. The complaining member is not 
formally accusing the responding member of having failed to take 
action not otherwise required under GATT-WIO agreements. It 
would be surpnsmg, however,· if responding members-
encouraged by their proud competition law enforcement authori-
ties and the concerned domestic firms-did not take umbrage at 
the insinuation that they were not enforcing their competition 
laws. One would expect responding members in most cases to vig-
orously defend against the charge that they in effect tolerated anti-
competitive behavior in their domestic market, as well as to cham-
pion the cause of their domestic firms by coming to their defense. 
Besides questions of lost pride, responding members stand to have 
trade benefits suspended if complaining members are successful in 
their non-violation, competition policy complaints. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Trade and competition policy share the goal of ensuring that 
government and private anti-competitive activity, respectively, does 
not distort the efficient operation of markets. As noted by Philip 
Marsden: 
Trade officials traditionally have been concerned about the 
effect that public protectionist measures have on market forces 
between national markets. Antitrust officials traditionally have 
been concerned about exertions of market power within 
national markets. As globalization blurs the boundaries of mar-
kets, so too does it blur the borders between these areas of pol-
icy. Effective international antitrust enforcement can and does 
complement liberal trade policy. However, those who seek to 
reconstitute antitrust as a new trade remedy may be forgetting 
that market access is a means to an end and not an end in itself. 
One lowers trade barriers to increase the efficient operation of 
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market forces; one does not break up efficient market structures 
to increase trade flOWS. 146 
In short, although the purpose of trade law and competition law is 
broadly the same-to open markets-the two bodies of law are not 
congruent. For example, the antidumping duty law punishes con-
duct that would be considered lawful under the price discrimina-
tion and predat()rypricing laws. Trade policy officials may deem all 
vertical restraints that block or impede market access unlawful 
without first asking, as would national antitrust enforcement 
authorities, whether such restraints create efficiencies that, on bal-
ance, maximize consumer welfare. . 
It has been suggested that trade policy officials should 
encourage and even cajole competition policy officials to enforce 
their competition laws more aggressively.147 The argument is that 
"trade policy officials view private trade barriers as a current prob-
lem [that] indicates a perception that, on .the whole, competition 
laws in many countries are not presently addressing such private 
conduct in a sufficiently effective manner."148 But should competi-
tion law officials pander to trade law officials simply because the 
latter equate denial of market access with private anti-competitive 
behavior, in the absence of some showing that market foreclosure 
is the result of an obvious government-imposed barrier to trade? 
While calls for greater assertiveness in antitrust law enforcement 
may in themselves be harmless enough, how are developing coun-
tries with either. no competition law or effective enforcement 
mechanism supposed to respond? How are countries with a compe-
tition law in place, but with insufficient resources to investigate and 
prosecute all allegations of private anti-competitive behavior, sup-
posed to respond? Moreover, demands by trade officials for more 
aggressive competition law enforcement may not be so harmless if 
they draw attention away from the real culprits. The latter could 
include a lack of competitiveness on the part of domestic produc-
ers and exporters in world markets-a charge that elected officials 
are reluctant to level at their own constituents-or foreign markets 
may be closed to imports because of government barriers to trade 
erected by importing countries, not by private persons. Removing 
government barriers to trade remains the WTO's raison d'etre and 
its unfinished business. Focusing (obsessing?). on private barriers to 
trade may be a red herring that distracts the WTO from complet-
146. Philip Marsden, "Antitrust" at the WTO, 13 ANTITRUST 28, 32-33 (1998). 
147. See Hudec, supra note 23, at 84. 
148. Id. 
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ing the job for which it was created, namely, to remove government 
barriers to trade. 
Until such time as trade law and policy reflect a full understand-
ing that not all denials of market access by private actors are per se 
unlawful, competition law and policy should be left to the competi-
tion enforcement authorities. In the United States, the process-ori-
ented approach adopted by the Justice Department and the 
Federal Trade Commission in concluding bilateral antitrust coop-
eration and mutual assistance agreements with major trading part-
ners (Canada, the EU, and Japan), with minor trading partners 
(Australia and Israel), and with developing countries (Brazil and 
Mexico) has created a forum for the constructive exchange of 
views about national antitrust enforcement activities when those 
activities cross national borders. The results-oriented approach of 
the USTR-adversarial and confrontational in nature-is at odds 
with a conciliatory, cooperative approach that seeks mutually satis-
factory resolution of these sensitive policy questions. 
Many WTO members remain opposed to a multilateral agree-
ment on competition policy as being both premature and unwar-
ranted. Because nearly 40 percent of the WTO members have not 
enacted competition legislation or established a competition 
authority, proposals for a multilateral agreement are premature. In 
some countries the adoption of measures liberalizing trade and 
investment flows would be an adequate competition policy, making 
an agreement on competition policy for them unwarranted. I49 Par-
ticipants in the WGTCP have conceded that it is unrealistic to 
expect a convergence of the objectives of trade and competition 
policy.I50 While competition policy focuses on efficiency and con-
sumer welfare, trade policy's objective is to protect and advance 
the interests of domestic producers. This divergence can yield a 
determination, for example, that a given vertical restraint is accept-
able under competition policy because there are a sufficient num-
ber of competing domestic firms, but is unacceptable under trade 
policy if it blocks market access to foreign producers. 151 
Work at the WTO on global competition rules might have a 
greater chance of proceeding in the right direction if it was 
informed by one competition policy principle in particular: a con-
cern for consumer welfare. This is not expressly recognized in any 
of the WTO agreements, as it is assumed that efficiency savings 
149. SeeWGTCP 1999 Report, supra note 41, at 17 para. 54. 
150. See id. at 9 para. 27. 
151. See id. 
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from reduced barriers to international trade will trickle down even-
tually. It is possible for market opening initiatives to have ineffi-
cient outcomes, however. This is particularly the case with attempts 
to manage trade by balancing the market share and profit opportu-
nities of international rivals. Allowing market access principles to 
override or ignore antitrust's core concern with consumer welfare 
may put efficient market structures at risk and provide more 
opportunity for powerful competitors to distort the independence 
and impartiality of antitrust enforcement. 
The economic arguments for government intervention to cor-
rect market failures brought on by restrictive business practices 
may be strong, but those arguments do not necessarily lead inexo-
rably to the conclusion that a multilateral agreement on norms 
and enforcement is the best response. Forcing the bitter pill of 
international regulation of competition policy down the throats of 
countries that are not prepared or willing to accept such rules is a 
formula for disaster. Developed countries might bully less-powerful 
developing countries into entering into such agreements as the 
price of continued WTO membership, but adherence to the com-
mitments made in such agreements will be begrudging and cheat-
ing at the margins widespread. In order for international 
agreements to be durable and robust, parties must perceive them 
as being in their self-interest. 
The WGTCP and the Working Group on the Relationship 
between Trade and Investment have provided useful first steps in 
the exchange of views on trade, investment, and competition policy 
issues. While progress has been made on achieving a better under-
standing of WTO members' positions on these issues, much still 
divides them. Because WTO Working Groups are ad hoc bodies 
with no permanent mandate, it might be appropriate to institution-
alize the process by creating permanent consultative bodies within 
the WTO. First, the 1960 GATT Decision on Arrangements for 
Consultations on Restrictive Business Practices should be resur-
rected and reinvigorated. 152 Next, standing committees on Trade 
and Competition Policy and on Trade and Investment could be 
created that would report direcdy to the General Council. 153 These 
Committees would continue the work started by the two Working 
152. Decision on Restrictive Business Practices: Arrangements for Consultations, Dec. 
18, 1960, GAlT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 28. 
153. WTO standing committees that report directly to the General Council include the 
Trade and Development Committee, the Trade and Environment Committee, and the 
Regional Trade Agreements Committee. 
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Groups. If such standing committees are established, they should 
be directed to coordinate their work with the OEeD, which has 
made important contributions to the trade-investment and trade-
competition policy interface. 154 
In conclusion, while the linkages between trade, investment, and 
competition policy are undeniable, the WTO's current agenda is 
unfinished, its authority fragile, and its dispute settlement mecha-
nism under stress. To saddle the Organization with yet more hot-
button issues-a virtual lightening rod planted on its institutional 
head-would. do little but further undermine the WTO's status 
and drain valuable and scarce institutional resources away from its 
primary mission of promoting liberal trade. From a GATT-WTO 
perspective, maintaining the status quo in the areas of competition 
policy and investment, coupled with further research and study of 
these subjects, is the only unambiguously beneficial course of 
action for the WTO. Now is not the right time, and the WTO is not 
the right place, for negotiating multilateral agreements on invest-
ment and competition policy. 
154. See, e.g., OECD, Joint Group on Trade and Competition, Outline of (A) Core Princi-
ples, Common Approaches and Common Standards and (B) Bilateral and Multilateral Approaches 
(Oct. 13, 1999); Consistencies and Inconsistencies Between Trade and Competition Policies (Feb. 
25, 1999); Competition Elements in International Trade Agreements: A Post-Uruguay Round Over-
view ofwro Agreements (Jan. 29,1999); Complementarities Between Trade and Competition Poli-
cies (Jan. 29, 1999). These documents are available at http://www.oecd.org/ daf/ c\p (last 
visited May 17, 2000). 
